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ABSTRACT
BIRDS WITH WORDS
HOW TALKING PARROTS EXPAND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF COGNITION
Shereen Chang
Michael Weisberg
Humans often have difficulty accurately evaluating the cognitive capacities of nonhuman
animals. We have been biased in assuming human cognitive superiority and that the cognitive
capacities of other species ought to be measured by human standards of intelligence. Such
anthropocentric biases distort our scientific thinking about cognition and our relationships to
animals and their habitats, as we carelessly disrupt ecosystems and endanger animals.
Anthropocentric biases may lead humans to dismiss findings of nonhuman intelligence, especially
in animals not closely related to us. Empirical research shows that nonhuman and non-primate
animals engage in cognitively sophisticated behaviors. To counter our distorted perspective of
nonhuman animals, this dissertation urges greater consideration of the cognitive sophistication of
nonhumans, which can provide insight into the origins of our cognitive capacities. In particular, I
consider the research of Irene Pepperberg, who trained parrots to communicate referentially
using English words. Through an analysis of empirical research, including Pepperberg’s research
with Alex the parrot, I propose a four-dimensional model describing the conditions under which
such animals can actualize their capacity for referential communication (Chapter 2). The degree
to which Alex the parrot became an active communicator, not only by learning to use existing
English words but also by originating meaning by coining a new word, demonstrates the power of
his ability to learn under favorable training conditions (Chapter 3). To think accurately about the
cognitive capacities of organisms who are quite different from us, we need to focus on functional
relations rather than on superficial characteristics. I argue for a functional analytical framework
that allows us to compare similarly complex behaviours between different species and infer
similar underlying cognitive mechanisms (Chapter 4). That a parrot learned to use words within a
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training context suggests that non-primate animals have the capacity to learn proto-linguistic
forms of communication even when they do not evince such behavior in nature. In emphasizing
the importance of social-ecological context, training and motivation, this dissertation undermines
traditional anthropocentric assumptions about the inferiority of the cognitive capacities of nonprimates.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Section 1: On anthropocentric perspectives
Humans have consistently underestimated the cognitive capacities of nonhuman
animals. Descartes famously thought that animals were like mechanistic automatons
that could be vivisected without remorse. Locke assumed that parrots could only mimic
human speech without understanding. There are numerous examples of
anthropocentrism in the history of philosophy, but anthropocentrism is unfortunately not
a problem of the past. Much of Western thought is still in the grips of anthropocentrism
and its offshoots. Davidson has denied that non-linguistic animals could have beliefs and
desires.1 This dissertation aims to inoculate our thinking against the biases brought
about by such perspectives.
In terms of how we think about cognition, anthropocentrism permeates our
thinking in different ways. One way that cognitive anthropocentrism manifests is through
the assumption that humans are superior in cognitive ability and are the measure by
which all other species should be judged. A closely-related view is cognitive
primatocentrism, the assumption that primates are the most intelligent animals.
Anthropocentrism and primatocentrism often go together. The underlying idea seems to
be that since humans are the most intelligent beings on earth, then by extension the
most intelligent nonhumans must be those who are most closely related to humans.
According to this idea, great apes such as chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas, would
be the most intelligent nonhuman animals for they are our closest relatives; other
primates follow.

1

Donald Davidson, “Rational Animals,” Dialectica 36, no. 4 (2007): 317–327.
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Substantively, whether humans are cognitively superior to other species is an
empirical question that depends on our conception of cognitive ability. Regardless of
what we believe about the probability of human cognitive superiority, it is critical that
anthropocentric bias not encroach on our thinking about cognition. Anthropocentric bias
can distort our philosophical and scientific investigation. For instance, cognitive
anthropocentrism may be expressed through the assumption that human cognition ought
to be the standard by which other forms of cognition are measured. Even when not
explicitly expressed, such anthropocentrism may be implicitly expressed in scientific
studies when nonhuman animals are primarily evaluated on their ability to complete
human-typical cognitive tasks, rather than their ability to demonstrate cognitive skills
typical for their own species. While a nonhuman animal who executes human-typical
tasks may be considered intelligent, it may not be valid to infer that an animal is
unintelligent due to their failure to complete such task. Yet, when our investigation of
nonhuman animal cognition consists in judging nonhumans on human-typical tasks, it
may be difficult to resist the belief that humans are cognitively superior to nonhumans,
especially when we observe that humans tend to be better at such (human-typical)
tasks. Thus, anthropocentric methodology in our scientific thinking can feed into
substantively anthropocentric assumptions.
Anthropocentric and primatocentric assumptions are misguided for many
reasons. First, these biases distort our scientific investigation and understanding of
cognition. As rational thinkers and researchers, we should attempt to rid our thinking of
such biases, whether explicitly or implicitly held. Rather than assume that nonhuman
animals lack certain cognitive abilities, we should remain agnostic until the matter has
been adequately researched. Second, there are serious real-world consequences when
2

we fail to recognize the cognitive capabilities of animals accurately. We commit serious
ethical violations through our failure to properly consider non-human and non-primate
animals.
One sophisticated cognitive capacity that people often assume is lacking in nonprimates is the capacity for referential communication. However, such assumption is
unwarranted. As I show in this dissertation, non-primates do have the cognitive capacity
to communicate referentially. In particular, I will discuss the case of Alex the parrot, who
learned to communicate by using English words in a genuinely meaningful way.
Moreover, I will describe the conditions under which Alex actualized his capacity for
referential communication, conditions which seem to apply whether the learner is a
primate or non-primate. Thus, I use Alex the parrot as a case study to undermine the
anthropocentric and primatocentric assumptions that are implicit in our discourse about
cognition.
1.1 Distortions in our thought
Anthropocentric and primatocentric biases can distort our thinking about
cognition in different ways. First, it seems misguided to think of a single species as
providing the cognitive standard for all other species, as if the diverse breadth of
cognitive skills and abilities on earth could be reduced to a single linear scale. We
commonly recognize that even among humans, there are different kinds of intelligences
that do not necessarily go together (e.g., mathematical, linguistic, aesthetic, emotional,
street). In other words, a person who is highly intelligent in one domain is not necessarily
brilliant in other domains. There are different components to intelligence. Given our
awareness of the diversity of intelligence within the human species, we should expect
3

even more kinds of intelligence across different species, genera, families, orders,
classes, and phyla. In overemphasizing human-typical cognitive tasks, we may fail to
recognize unique cognitive skills and processes present in other species.
Second, there seems to be a disproportionate focus on cognitive research on
primates. Research findings regarding non-primate intelligence are often overlooked or
dismissed, while findings on primate intelligence are more readily discussed and
accepted. Theories have been forwarded about the origins of cognition that seem to
assume cognitive primatocentrism. Such theories would seem much less plausible if we
took into account the empirical evidence of complex cognitive and communicative
behaviours from different species across the animal kingdom.
Empirical evidence suggests that it would be wrong to think that non-primates
lack the cognitive sophistication often found in primates. Research has shown that nonprimate animals are skilled at long-distance migration and navigation, tool use, cultural
learning and referential communication, as I will elaborate on in this dissertation. Given
that there is much we do not understand about other animals, coupled with the cognitive
complexity we have already found in non-primate species, we should neither assume
that humans or primates are cognitively superior nor that the cognition of other species
can be adequately assessed by human cognitive standards.
To better understand cognition and its evolution, we need to look more closely at
the kinds of cognition found across different species. On my analysis, there are two main
paths for investigating the origins of human cognition from a comparative perspective.
First, we could study those most closely related to us, to understand how human
cognition differs from that of our closest relatives and try to understand what prompted
4

those differences. We could study human cognition in comparison to that of
chimpanzees and bonobos. From such comparisons, we might reason that the cognitive
abilities we share could have been inherited from our last common ancestor, while our
cognitive differences could have developed after the evolutionary lines diverged.
Second, we could study animals with behaviours that are similarly complex as ours, in
the hopes of understanding how the cognitive capacities underlying those complexities
came about.
Both lines of investigation are needed, especially for studying cognitive
characteristics that differ between humans and our closest relations. Consider the
sophisticated behaviour involved in communication. Many animals engage in
communication. Humans are known to communicate referentially using language, in a
variety of forms that are vocalized, written, or signed. As Tomasello has noted, most
primates do not engage in very sophisticated vocal communication, although they do
use gestures in ways that seem more flexible, sensitive, and sophisticated.2 Thus, it
seems that humans differ from other hominids in communicating referentially using
vocalizations. After we have uncovered this difference, there is little more that the first
path of investigation can tell us about the origins of our capacity for vocalized referential
communication. Nonetheless, there is still much we can learn via the second path of
investigation. In fact, birds have been found to use vocalizations to communicate in
referentially specific ways, both in nature and in the lab, as with Alex the parrot. We
ought not neglect the second path of investigation simply because the relevant animals
are birds who are less closely related to humans. To get a fuller picture of the cognitive

2

Michael Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).
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capacities that make referential communication possible, we need to better understand
birds (and other animals) that communicate referentially.
1.2 Non-epistemic consequences of anthropocentric and primatocentric thought
Aside from the detrimental effects on the state of our scientific knowledge, there
are larger implications of anthropocentrism and primatocentrism that we must take
seriously. Whether humans value the dignity and welfare of nonhuman animals can
depend on our assessment of their cognitive capacities. Under these conditions, it is
even more crucial that we can accurately assess the cognition of primate and nonprimate animals.
Indeed, some philosophers have argued directly for the moral status of animals
from their possession of certain psychological and cognitive capacities. According to
Tom Regan, if an animal has a set of cognitive capacities including the ability to have
beliefs, desires, emotions, perception, memory and a sense of the future, then the
animal has inherent moral value that must be considered.3 Peter Singer argued that
animals should be given equal moral consideration based on their capacity to feel pain.4
For those who endorse such views, it is vital to recognize the cognitive capacities of
other animals without being misled by anthropocentric or primatocentric biases. When
we mischaracterize animals as being less cognitively sophisticated than they are, we
might believe it acceptable to exploit them in morally impermissible ways.
Anthropocentrism and primatocentrism are cases of pernicious in-group
favouritism and out-group bias. In the course of human activity, we have repeatedly seen
the consequences of humans’ out-group bias in genocide and systematic violations of
3
4

Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
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human rights. Sometimes we recognize that it is wrong to exploit a population due to
unjustified assumptions about their inferiority. At other times, we may fail to recognize
the wrongness of such actions. Despite such epistemic and moral failures, it is always
unjustified to assume the inferiority of those we do not adequately understand. Not only
are such beliefs baseless, but also they are liable to licence morally egregious acts that
cannot be undone.
Anthropocentrism and primatocentrism are examples of morally and
epistemically unjustified patterns of thinking that good, rational people should seek to
avoid. Many people think it would be morally impermissible to wipe out an entire culture.
Yet, humanity has destroyed habitats and disrupted ecosystems, causing the extinction
of many species. Humans continue to endanger the populations and cultures of
nonhuman animals. Would we be as unconcerned about these anthropogenic
annihilations if we didn’t believe that we were the primary source of culture and
intelligence on earth? It is not clear how humans could deny the merits of decelerating
anthropogenic climate change if it were not assumed that we were the most valuable life
forms on earth. The biases given by anthropocentric and other in-group/out-group
perspectives trickle into our everyday thinking about social and environmental issues.
To think clearly about how we should live ethically and responsibly, we cannot
simply assume our superiority and that of those who are like us. Anthropocentrism and
primatocentrism are non-rational afflictions of the human mind that need to be countered
so that we may faithfully pursue scientific knowledge, undistorted by bias. I have
explained why it is critical that we accurately understand the cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals. Thus far, we have not done an adequate job, given that our thinking
about the cognition of animals, especially non-primates, is often still distorted. My
7

dissertation discusses the non-primate case study of Alex the parrot, thereby
demonstrating how a careful consideration of such research can counteract the
anthropocentric and primatocentric biases that pervade our thinking.
Section 2: The case of referential communication
Humans use language, but most nonhuman animals do not appear to do so. My
dissertation aims to undermine the assumption that there is a vast difference in human
and nonhuman cognitive capacities for referential communication, thus undercutting
anthropocentric assumptions about cognitive sophistication. If we observe that an animal
does not exhibit referentially communicative behaviour, we should first consider their
social and ecological context before jumping to the conclusion that they lack the
cognitive capacity for referential communication. In some cases, we can more fully
explain such behavioural differences, namely, the differential use of referential
communication, between human and nonhuman animals by appealing to differences in
their training and socioecological context, rather than by differences in kind in their
cognitive capacities.
I consider the implications of research demonstrating the ability of birds to
communicate referentially. Empirical research has shown that a parrot can acquire the
referential use of human words when socialized in a human linguistic environment and
given appropriate training. Not only did Alex the parrot learn to communicate using preexisting words he was taught, but also he became an active participant in creating
meaning when he coined a new word.
Contrary to anthropocentric assumptions, such research shows that the ability to
communicate referentially – and to even originate meaning in new words – is not some
rarefied capacity that only humans possess. Rather, such ability may be possessed by a
8

wide variety of different animals who may communicate referentially if they are part of (or
become part of) a referentially communicating social group. What the case of the talking
parrot shows us is that sociality and motivation play important roles in learning to
communicate, and that these animals have a powerfully flexible ability to learn interspecies forms of communication.
What do we need to explain these capacities in other animals? Existing attempts
to explain the capacity for referential communication are too focused on recursive
capacities in humans. These attempts fail to make sense of cases in which animals that
do not evince such recursive capacities nonetheless communicate referentially, and
often with intentions to refer. We need an account that explains cases of sophisticated
communicative behaviour with reference to the capacities these animals possess rather
than by reference to capacities they do not possess. So, what we need to understand
these cases is an analysis of cognition and communication that focuses on functional
relationships in language-like-learning.
In Chapter 2, I propose a four-dimensional model for the learning of referential
communication. The model does not presuppose capacities for recursion. On the
contrary, I show that much meaningful communication can be had without appeal to
recursion. The four dimensions of the model emphasize the importance of motivation in
the form of social and ecological incentives, demonstrating the usefulness of
referentiality to the learner, learning within a socially interactive context, and sufficiently
exposing the individual to the form of communication being learned. These four
dimensions provide a sufficient explanation for whether a human or nonhuman animal
who is capable of referential communication actually learns to communicate. Given the
learning model I propose, we cannot infer solely from the failure of a human or
9

nonhuman to acquire referential communication that they lack the cognitive capabilities
for such communication. On the contrary, we must take into consideration the presence
or absence of appropriate learning conditions before drawing conclusions about the
individual’s cognitive capabilities.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the case of the parrot who goes beyond merely learning
to use existing words by coining a new label himself. Through this act, Alex the parrot
became an active participant in originating meaning. Thus, the case of Alex shows us
how our philosophical theories of meaning are unnecessarily psychologically
demanding. Gricean theories of meaning assert the importance of third-order recursive
communicative intentions possessed by human speakers. I demonstrate that there is
little reason to think that third-order communicative intentions are necessary for
speakers to mean, or even to originate meaning. Such demands for third-order recursive
communicative intentions are not only unwarranted, but also they seem to reflect an
anthropocentric bias. That a parrot became such a fully participating communicator not
only corroborates the model I propose in Chapter 2, but also highlights the significance
of the particular training he received. I suggest that this case shows how important it is
for learners to observe the exchange of communicative roles amongst different users,
while they are learning referential communication in an interactive social context.
In Chapter 4, I argue that we need a functional analysis to make sense of
interspecific inferences about the capacities underlying similar communicative
behaviours. When a nonhuman animal behaves in a way that’s similar to a human, when
can we infer that the nonhuman’s mental processes are similar to a human’s? For
example, when a person says, “I want a cracker,” we assume that the human means
what she says. We think that she knows what her words mean, that she wants a cracker,
10

or at least she wants the listener to think she wants a cracker. Now consider when a
parrot says “I want a cracker.” When can we infer that the parrot likewise means what he
says, knows what his words mean and wants a cracker? One approach is to justify
inferences based on the assumption that similar behaviours originated in the same trait
inherited from a common ancestor. However, such an approach is only viable when the
animals are very closely related, thus a common-cause approach is not helpful when
dealing with animals that are distantly related. Another approach is to justify an
analogical inference based on the idea that the causal factors leading to both behaviours
are equivalent in structure. However, we cannot assume from similar-seeming
communicative behaviours that similar causal structures are at work in these species.
We need a framework that is flexible enough to account for the complex capacities for
referential communication, whether they arise from ancestral inherited traits or due to
convergent evolution. I show that a functional analysis allows us to draw analogies
between these behaviours and their capacities, thus providing a principled framework for
us to understand the cognitive capacities of animals who behave in sophisticated and
complex ways.

11

CHAPTER 2: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM HOW A PARROT LEARNS TO SPEAK
LIKE A HUMAN? A MODEL FOR REFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION LEARNING
Section 1: Background
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I propose a model that shows how animals learn to communicate
referentially. By “model”, I mean a representation of key factors in the acquisition of
referential communication. Although many animals may have the cognitive capacities for
referential communication, whether they learn to communicate referentially depends on
other factors. My model represents these four key factors (motivation, demonstrated
usefulness, social context and exposure) and thus illuminates their importance in
actualizing one’s capacity for referential communication. Furthermore, given that
linguistic communication is a subset of referential communication, my proposed model
also sheds light on the significance of these factors in the human capacity for language.
My proposed model makes sense of a wide range of empirical research,
explaining observed results of animals learning referential communication to greater and
lesser degrees of success. My MUSE model explains the great success Irene
Pepperberg found in training grey parrots to communicate referentially with English
words, as her subjects learned under conditions that fulfilled all four dimensions of the
model. The MUSE model also explains why Nicolas Giret et al.’s grey parrot subjects,
who were trained in conditions that do not fulfill the four dimensions, failed to acquire
referential use of words. The MUSE model can also be generalized to other animals
learning to communicate referentially with word-like symbols, as seen in bottle-nosed
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dolphins trained by Louis Herman. Additionally, the model succeeds in explaining
second-language learning in humans.
Furthermore, the MUSE model applies not only to animals learning human words
and language, but also more generally to animals learning species-typical forms of
referential communication. I then consider cases of interspecies “eavesdropping”
behaviour in wild animals and suggest avenues for further research that would
productively illuminate the scope of the MUSE model.
1.2 Relevance to existing debate
As far as we have observed, only humans use language. Some humans assume
that humans are the only ones capable of linguistic communication. According to
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, our faculty of language, broadly understood, is comprised
of different components, many of which are shared with other animal species. Hauser et
al. hypothesize that, except for the uniquely human capacity for recursion, each of the
other components are shared with at least some other animal species.5 According to
them, the main difference between human and non-human animal communication is that
human languages have a rich open-ended power of expression based on the capacity
for recursion. Our capacity for recursion allows us to insert phrases into existing
sentences, thereby creating new sentences. For example, we could modify a sentence
such as “The parrot could not fly” by inserting the phrase “known as Alex” to formulate
the longer sentence “The parrot known as Alex could not fly.” More words and phrases
can be added -- in accordance with grammatical rules -- to create successively longer
sentences, each with understandable meaning.
Marc D. Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and W. Tecumseh Fitch, “The Faculty of Language: What Is
It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?,” Science 298, no. 5598 (2002): 1573.
5
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Having identified such recursion as unique to human language, Hauser et al.
believe that our capacity for recursion can shed light on the faculty of language, broadly
understood. My project identifies other conditions that play a critical role in human
communication and that may also be distinctive to referential communication. We need
to understand these factors to better understand the evolution of language. At the same
time, my project emphasizes cases in which nonhuman animals learned to communicate
using parts of human language, which suggests that a latent capacity to learn referential
communication may be more widespread than typically believed, and that we ought not
underestimate the importance of social and motivational conditions for learning. These
factors may provide a fuller explanation for why we do not see more nonhuman animals
using linguistic communication, although they may use referential or other forms of
communication.
Michael Tomasello believes that we should look to primate gestural
communication to understand the development of our faculty of language, since apes
use gestures to communicate in ways that are flexible and sensitive to the recipient’s
attention.6 Tomasello notes that, in contrast to their gestures, non-human apes’
vocalizations are inflexible and insensitive to attention. Thus, he argues that “ape
gestures – in all of their flexibility and sensitivity to the attention of the other – and not
ape vocalizations – in all of their inflexibility and ignoring of others – are the original font
from which the richness and complexities of human communication and language have
flowed.”7 By emphasizing non-human ape communication, Tomasello focuses on likely
precursors of human communication in our closest relatives. According to Tomasello,
apes engage in intentional communication, the components of which are precursors to
6
7

Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication, 55.
Tomasello, 55.
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those of cooperative communication, which emerges in humans with the transformative
power of recursive intention-reading.
I take a different, though complementary, approach wherein I look to non-primate
animals who are capable of learning referentially communicative behaviour. Research
studies in which non-primates (e.g., dolphins and parrots) have been trained to use
human language are illuminating, especially when formal tests demonstrate that they
can comprehend and differentiate the meanings of different symbols. Some of these
animals demonstrate flexible vocalized referential communication and cooperative
communicative behaviour without evincing the capacity for recursive intention-reading.
Although these animals are not as closely related to humans, their ability to engage in
shared, referential communication can nonetheless shed light on the conditions
surrounding the development of these capacities.
1.3 Referential communication, productional specificity and perceptual specificity
My aim is to investigate the capacity for referential communication, which
involves the ability of a communicator to use referential symbols in a way that is
sensitive and fitting to their communicative meaning. (This is distinct from the
metacognitive ability to understand and articulate how reference works.) In referential
communication, there is a reliable relationship between the vehicle (e.g. the word or
other symbol) and its meaning. This relationship can be used to transmit information
between communicators. To use an example common in human linguistic
communication, a speaker S engages in referential communication when S says to
recipient R, “Bird!” while S grasps what the word means and communicates to R.
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Recipient R engages in referential communication when R understands the meaning of
S saying “Bird!” (e.g., that there is an avian animal present).
While specifying the speaker’s mental state of understanding is an easy way to
stipulate cases of referential communication, it is not the only way to establish an
appropriate sensitivity to referentiality. Moreover, it can be difficult to determine what a
speaker thinks and understands about her own and others’ communications, when we
lack a language in common, as is often the case with nonhuman animals. This is
especially true when observing the ways that nonhuman animals naturally communicate
in the field. It would be difficult to collect legitimate scientific evidence by simply
assuming the presence of particular mental states of understanding.
Thus, ethologists look to demonstrate that a given animal call has referential
specificity and contains information about the external world by observing the animals’
behaviour.8 Ethologists suggest two necessary parts to demonstrating referential
specificity in a call: productional specificity, suggesting that the producer of the call
encodes specific information in the call, and perceptual specificity, suggesting that the
information is perceived by other animals who hear the call.9 Many animals have
demonstrated referentially specific behaviour, most commonly via alarm calls that
distinguish between at least two types of predators. Animals whose calls show some
referential specificity include many ground squirrels, tree squirrels, dwarf mongooses,
suricates, prairie dogs, several species of monkeys, and chickens.10 Productional
specificity can be demonstrated when callers consistently use a particular alarm call type
Judith Kiriazis and C. N. Slobodchikoff, “Perceptual Specificity in the Alarm Calls of Gunnison’s
Prairie Dogs,” Behavioural Processes 73, no. 1 (July 1, 2006): 29,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2006.01.015.
9 Kiriazis and Slobodchikoff, 29.
10 Kiriazis and Slobodchikoff, 29.
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for one type of predator, and another call type for a different type of predator. Perceptual
specificity may be evidenced when animals who hear these alarm calls respond with
evasive behaviours appropriate for that predator type (as indicated in the call).
Such a system of differentiated alarm calls fits into the picture of signalling
games given by David Lewis and Brian Skyrms.11 Skyrms describes a game with a
sender and a receiver who are cooperative, but who lack pre-existing conventions of
meaning. Supposing the sender wishes to transmit information to the receiver about two
possible states in the world (e.g., food, predator) and has two kinds of possible signals
(e.g., short, long), the sender can use a strategy that differentiates between each of the
two possible states. For example, the sender could consistently use the short call in the
presence of a predator, and the long call for food; such calls would demonstrate
productional specificity. Upon receiving the signals, the receiver could likewise
differentiate her behavioural responses to the call type. The best outcome for both would
be to coordinate such that the receiver’s behavioural response is appropriate to the
state, e.g., come eat when there is food, and hide when there are predators.
Conventional meaning arises when the sender and receiver have coordinated to the
extent that the receiver acts optimally for each state of affairs in the world.12 In our
example, the short call would mean there is a predator present, which should prompt the
receiver to hide, while the long call would mean that there is food, which should prompt
the receiver to eat. These calls would then also demonstrate perceptual specificity, when
the receiver acts in accordance with the information encoded in the calls. Note that the
meaning of the signals in the game is arbitrary, as it matters not which signal is used to
indicate the presence of food; it could just as well have been the short call that signals
11
12

Brian Skyrms, Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (Oxford University Press, 2010).
Brian Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82.
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food. However, I do not intend to argue here that conventional meaning is necessarily at
work in systems of differentiated alarm calls found in nature. In cases that demonstrate
both productional and perceptual specificity, the signals evidently appear to be shared
between individuals; whether the signals are arbitrary is a separate matter beyond the
scope of this paper.
Note also that even when an animal’s calls evince both productional and
perceptual specificity, there is no logical requirement that the animal mentally
understand the meaning of the call, beyond associating the call with a kind of predator.
For the purposes of this paper, I find it useful to follow the ethological method in primarily
conceiving of referential communication in terms of observable behaviours rather than
mental states for two main reasons. First, we have greater access to the behaviours of
nonhuman animals than their mental states. Second, in forgoing claims about the
mentality of communicators at this point, I leave open the opportunity to make inferences
about their mental processes and cognitive capacities later, without risk of circularity. In
this way, I aim to shed light on the evolution of such capacities.
1.4 Aims
This paper is part of a project that aims to disambiguate between the following
two types of claims -- we are not warranted to infer directly from 1 to 2. Put simply,
“Don’t” doesn’t imply “can’t”:
1. Species X uniquely excels at communicating in species-X’s way. Humans
uniquely excel at human linguistic communication.
a. This is a (trivially true) claim about every species being especially
adapted to species-specific behaviours. Just as humans are uniquely
18

suited to communicating in human languages, grey parrots are uniquely
suited at using grey parrot calls, given that the use of grey parrot calls
arise in the context of grey parrot behaviour.
2. Only humans have the level of cognitive ability necessary for complex
communication.
a. This is a claim about the level and kind of cognitive ability necessary to be
able to communicate in certain ways.
b. This claim also implicates a certain understanding of the nature of the
cognitive ability for communication, namely that it comes in increasing
“levels” such that humans have “the most” ability and nonhumans have
“less” ability, rather than different abilities suited to their own speciesspecific modes of communication.
In proposing a four-dimensional model for the acquisition of referential
communication, I aim to highlight the importance of social and ecological context when
thinking about communicative behaviours and capacities. If the context in which an
animal lives does not demand linguistic communication, linguistic behaviour is unlikely to
arise. When the animal’s context demands referential communication, such behaviour is
likely to be found in animals that survive. Indeed, we see many cases of referential
specificity in animal calls in nature; it seems plausible to infer that referential
communication is beneficial and adaptive in those cases.
Likewise, if we see nonhuman animals communicating referentially but not
linguistically, perhaps our default assumption should be that it is beneficial for them to
communicate referentially but not linguistically. Indeed, signals that communicate the
most urgent, salient information may be the most efficient way for animals to coordinate
action without alerting predators (or prey) to their presence. Some animal signals may
19

appear “simple” to human observers -- especially in comparison to human language -but more importantly, the signals may be optimally suited for their ecological context. For
example, Moura et al. found that orange-winged Amazon parrots use gestures to signal
to their partners when it is safe to enter the nest site.13 Though parrots are known for
their vocal learning, they can also use other modes of communication when needed. In
this case, an adaptive mode of communication for these parrots involves gestures that
allow them to coordinate movements to avoid alerting predators to the nest. Thus, by
using silent signals when needed, these green parrots and their nest might remain
hidden from predators. This suggests a highly flexible capacity for communication that
starts to look like the human capacity for language; humans can also learn to
communicate in different languages, in different modalities, depending on what context
demands. Perhaps many species across the animal kingdom have an underlying
capacity for referential communication that is flexible and highly sensitive to socioecological context, given that who our interlocutors are and what “language” they speak
informs which signals are most beneficial for us to learn.
I contend that the success researchers have found in training animal subjects to
learn human words or languages suggests that many animals have the capacity to learn
more sophisticated, proto-linguistic forms of communication, even when they do not
evince such behaviour in nature, when their ecological contexts do not demand or allow
it. Thus, we must recognize the power of these animals’ ability to learn to communicate
referentially when they need to.
1.5 The MUSE model for referential communication learning

Leiliany N. Moura et al., “Gestural Communication in a New World Parrot,” Behavioural
Processes 105 (June 1, 2014): 46–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2014.03.003.
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I propose a model to represent how animals learn to communicate referentially. I
suggest that the following four dimensions under which Irene Pepperberg trained Alex
the grey parrot to acquire the meaningful use of English words are key features of
learning referential communication in general. I refer to this as the MUSE model of
communication learning, after each of the four dimensions.
i.

Motivation: Subject has sufficient motivation to learn

ii. Usefulness shown: The usefulness of referentiality is explicitly demonstrated to
the subject
iii. Social context: Learning occurs in a social context that is interactive
iv. Exposure: Subject has regular, sufficient exposure to the referential
communication system
When an animal is trained under conditions that fully realize the four MUSE dimensions,
we should expect that animal to learn to communicate referentially. Under conditions
that satisfy the MUSE dimensions only partially or not at all, we should expect a
corresponding decrease in success in the animal’s learning.
I will present evidence that this model applies to mammals and parrots, who are
cognitively capable of acquiring referential communication. Whether the model applies
more generally to all social animals capable of referential communication is an open
question. Although I focus on referential communication in this paper, it is possible that
this model also applies to acquiring other forms of communication or learning other
social skills.
Section 2: Analysis from parrots learning referential communication
In this section, I give evidence for the claim that the MUSE conditions are needed
for grey parrots to acquire referential communication. First, I describe the methods used
21

by Pepperberg to train Alex to understand English words, then I discuss evidence that
each condition was needed for parrots to learn to use words.
2.1 Pepperberg’s research
Researcher Irene Pepperberg trained a grey parrot named Alex to use English
words and phrases appropriately.14. Alex succeeded in learning to use words
referentially and functionally. Under Pepperberg’s training regimen, Alex learned to
correctly label objects, such as “paper” and “key”.15 Alex demonstrated a referential use
of English words in formal testing. In 200 tests, he gave the correct object labels on his
first try 80% of the time.16 He responded correctly to questions asking him to describe
the colour, shape and material properties of novel objects. Alex also showed
understanding of relative properties by correctly indicating the bigger or smaller object
when queried. Not only could he correctly identify objects and their properties, he
understood how to use words for categories and concepts. When given two objects and
asked “What’s same?” or “What’s different?”, he could respond with the correct category
of the common property (e.g. “color”, “shape”).17 That he could give the correct category
(e.g. “color”) of the relative similarity rather than the specific property (e.g, “blue”) shows
that he understood the meaning of the words being used. To pass this task, Alex needed
to understand not only the question, but also the meaning of “color” and how color, as a
category, relates to individual colors like blue. If there was no similarity (or difference)
between the two objects, he could indicate the lack of that relation by answering “none.”
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15 Pepperberg, 38.
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Thus, Alex demonstrated that he used words referentially and meaningfully in two-way
communication, i.e., both producing and receiving communication.
Additionally, Alex was able to use functional phrases to make requests. He used
“Want X” to request some object X, e.g., “Want nut”. He also showed that he
understood his own utterances. When he requested an object X and was offered a
different object Y, he would refuse Y and often repeat his request for X.18 His rejection of
unrequested objects shows that he intentionally requested a desired object and meant
something in particular in uttering his request. Since Alex often asked for items that
were not in view, his requests did not depend on exposure to an external stimulus (e.g.,
seeing the object); his functional use of such object words were independent of any
external stimuli. Alex’s requesting behaviour suggests that he intended to communicate
his desire, since he expected a specific behaviour in response to his request (i.e., the
researcher fetching the requested object for Alex). Thus, Alex used words to
communicate what he wanted to others. His referential word use was functional, similar
to how typical English speakers use words to achieve what they want.
Thus, Alex demonstrated both the receptive use (via his comprehension of
spoken words) and productive use (via his choice and vocalization of appropriate words)
of English words he had been taught. Under Pepperberg’s training, Alex acquired a
repertoire of many English words that he used in appropriate contexts.
Although Alex could recombine some words, particularly in requesting different
objects with “Want X”, his syntax was limited. He did not speak English with full
competence; rather he communicated using some English words in an extremely
simplified form. Most of the words he used were property and object labels. It is
unknown whether he could have been capable of a more fully syntactic linguistic
18

Pepperberg, The Alex Studies, 38.

23

communication if he had been appropriately trained in this way. Nonetheless, although
Alex lacked the full capacity of language, he was able to communicate meaningfully with
his simplified English utterances.
2.2 Pepperberg’s method
Pepperberg acquired Alex when he was about one year old.19 Under various
training methods that emphasized social context and interaction, Alex learned to
communicate using English words. To introduce new words to the parrot, Pepperberg
primarily used a Model/Rival technique adapted from German biologist Dietmar Todt.20
Pepperberg adapted Todt’s socially interactive method to also demonstrate the
functionality of referential labels. She was influenced by Dore's idea that learners would
acquire referential symbols under these conditions; she thought that the "evolution of
indexical signs into denotive symbols occurs through social and emotional interaction
with caretakers, specifically through dialogues in which both reference and function are
explicitly demonstrated."21 Accordingly, in her Model/Rival training method, two human
trainers would show how target words could be used in a social context. One human
would act as the teacher, while the other human acted as the parrot’s peer student,
model and rival. The teacher would ask the human peer questions so that the peer
could demonstrate desired and undesired behaviour. Alex could also observe the
teacher’s reactions to these responses, including any rewards or corrections to incorrect
or poorly pronounced answers. Then, the teacher would ask questions of Alex and
respond to his answers in kind. In Pepperberg’s lab, the humans would switch roles, so
that no human was exclusively associated with the role of the teacher nor that of the
19
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student. Thus, Alex was able to observe that questioning and responding functions are
not static or invariably tied to particular people, but rather these roles are exchanged
between speakers at different times. This may have facilitated Alex’s readiness to take
on these roles as a speaker himself. Indeed, when the Pepperberg lab acquired other
grey parrots, Alex sometimes participated by serving as the model/rival in the training of
these new students.
Though the Model/Rival technique was the primary method used in Alex’s
language training, Pepperberg also used other methods that fulfilled at least some of the
key conditions. One method involved repetition within a social context. After Alex
attempted to vocalize a new word in the presence of the referent object, trainers would
repeat the word in different sentences to clarify its pronunciation, reminiscent of how
human parents talk to young children.22
Pepperberg also used referential mapping or “fast mapping” techniques that
involved demonstrating referentiality and its usefulness within a social context, while
taking advantage of novel vocalizations. When Alex spontaneously recombined speech
sounds (or words) into intelligible utterances (words or phrases), researchers would
reward his utterance by presenting to him the corresponding object, thus demonstrating
the utility of the utterance within the social context.23
Other teaching methods were more informal, constituting part of the richly
interactive environment in which the researchers encouraged Alex to acquire words.
Alex would interact with researchers during the day, outside of formal training and
testing sessions. Thus, he had the opportunity to direct his own learning based on his
22
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own interest. In one example, he learned the word “grey” after seeing his reflection in the
mirror and asking his trainers, “What color?”24 Thus, learning also occurred when driven
by Alex’s own curiosity and motivation to learn new labels.
In these different ways involving social interaction with humans speaking the
language, and showing the utility of language’s referentiality, Alex learned various
English words. Thus, a parrot acquired parts of the English language through techniques
similar to how humans learn to speak English: under conditions involving social
interaction, demonstrating the usefulness of words, when motivated to learn, with regular
exposure.
2.3 The significance of motivation in grey parrot learning
For grey parrots to learn to communicate referentially with human words, they
need to be sufficiently motivated to learn. To support this claim, we can compare the
research programs conducted by Irene Pepperberg and Nicolas Giret et al. In both
research programs, grey parrots were trained using Model/Rival method to learn human
words.25 Thus, all parrot subjects in the two research programs were regularly exposed
to humans and words, under conditions with social interaction and demonstrated
functionality. As discussed earlier, Pepperberg met with great success when Alex the
parrot learned the appropriate use of different English labels. In contrast, the Giret et al.
subjects had difficulty learning labels and demonstrating a consistent association
between the labels and their corresponding items. Some parrots learned to vocalize the
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label but did not demonstrate a sustained and correct association between the label and
its corresponding item, while other parrots were not observed to vocalize any of the
labels at all.
I suggest that a primary factor explaining the difference in results between the
two research programs is that the Giret et al. parrots lacked sufficient motivation to learn
whereas Alex was highly motivated. We can compare the conditions under which the
parrots lived in the different labs. In the Giret et al. labs, the parrots were housed
together and therefore in regular contact with conspecifics. They had plenty of
opportunity to socialize with other parrots. Since any social need could be met by other
parrots, it was not necessary for them to learn words to communicate with humans in
order to fill such a need. In general, the parrots’ basic needs were met outside of training
and testing. Their social-ecological context did not require that they learn human words
to gain access to food, water, or shelter, for example. Thus, these parrots likely lacked
sufficient motivation to learn to communicate with humans. Giret et al. also consider
such motivational factors in explaining why a parrot stopped producing labels after she
initially learned them. According to them, she may have been “strongly imprinted to a
few caretakers and trainers and after they had left the laboratory, she was no longer
motivated to imitate human speech.”26
In contrast, Alex had no contact with conspecifics or other parrots for his first 15
years in the Pepperberg lab. He had no other birds to socialize with (until the lab
acquired more parrots). During that time, Alex’s only possible source of sociality would
have been the humans in the lab. If Alex had social needs, they could only be met by
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socializing with humans. Therefore, he was likely highly motivated to communicate with
human experimenters. His isolation from conspecifics and immersion within a human
social context provided the conditions for him to be highly motivated to communicate
with humans. Moreover, researchers would discourage Alex from using non-word-like
vocalizations by ignoring him if he whistled or called. In the Pepperberg lab, the only
beings available for Alex to socialize with were humans, and the approved outlet for
vocal interaction with humans was to use words. If Alex needed to socialize and
communicate, he would have been highly motivated to learn English words, since it was
the only way to meet those needs. Indeed, Giret et al. write, “Pepperberg’s parrots may
have a much stronger bond to their main caretaker than ours do with their caretakers.
This bond could mean that Pepperberg’s parrots are more attentive and motivated
during training sessions.”27
In addition to the need for sociality, there may be other motivational factors at
play. A learner could be motivated to learn to communicate for its functional value,
especially if there are needs that can only be filled by doing so. For instance, Alex was
unable to fly and therefore may have depended on humans not only for his social needs
but also to bring him desired items or to take him back to his cage. Giret et al. note that
since their parrots could fly, they could fly away whenever they were not motivated to
work during training sessions. They note that “being dependant on humans to move may
influence the parrot’s behaviour during training sessions, and probably increase the
attention of the subject.”28 Giret et al. also observed that the parrots’ level of interest in
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the object being trained could also affect their levels of attention and motivation to learn
the corresponding label.29
One might wonder what counts as a sufficient level of motivation to learn. One
might raise a concern about circularity: if an individual successfully acquires referential
communication, we infer that the four MUSE conditions obtain; when there is not
successful learning, we can infer that the conditions did not obtain. In response, I would
emphasize that the kind of motivation that is most critical here has to do with social and
ecological context. In particular, if the social-ecological context requires referential
communication, then the individual is more likely to be sufficiently motivated to learn
(assuming the individual wants to succeed in this context). The requirement could be
based on social needs (as with Alex the parrot), on basic survival needs (e.g., obtaining
food or avoiding predators), or on obtaining other valuable goods. When the socialecological context does not require it to achieve an important good, then the MUSE
model predicts a higher probability of failure to learn referential communication.
Assuming the potential learner L is a social animal, if L socializes with
conspecifics who communicate referentially with each other, L is likely to be sufficiently
socially motivated to learn such mode of communication. Since L’s social group would
be comprised of conspecifics, I would expect L, as a social animal, to be motivated to
integrate with them in learning to use referential communication. However, if L’s social
group is comprised of conspecifics, none of whom communicate referentially, then L is
unlikely to be socially motivated to acquire referential communication. The situation
becomes more complex when L is a social animal who lacks social access to
conspecifics. If L has social access only to referential communicators, L could be
29
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motivated to integrate socially into that group, in which case L needs to learn to
communicate referentially with group members. If L has social access to referential
communicators as well as non-referential communicators, then who L socializes with can
predict whether L will be socially motivated to acquire referential communication.
A possible experiment to test this model could be conducted with parrot subjects
in variable social conditions. All parrot subjects would receive the same training, e.g., 60minute sessions of Model/Rival training with two human trainers twice per day. In the
first condition, subjects would live with conspecifics in a flock and are thus free to
socialize with other parrots outside of training sessions. In the second condition, subjects
would have no contact with other parrots, but could interact socially with only humans
outside of (and during) training. Thus, subjects would be able to socialize only with
referentially-communicating humans.30 In a third condition, subjects would have no
contact with other parrots, but have contact with both humans and a non-referentiallycommunicating dog outside of training. However, the humans avoid unnecessary contact
with the subject outside of training, so that the subject and dog may be prompted to
socialize with each other but not with humans. The humans would also avoid socializing
with the dog, such that the dog would be available for socializing with the parrot subject.
All else being equal, I would expect parrot subjects to acquire referential communication
most readily in the second condition and least readily in the first condition.
In any case in which the individual lacks social motivation to learn referential
communication, a sufficiently strong non-social need for referential communication would
help to motivate such learning. For example, an animal could be motivated to learn if
30
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referential communication was needed to obtain food for survival. In the absence of any
social or ecological incentives to acquire referential communication, the MUSE model
predicts that the individual is unlikely to learn.
2.4 The significance of demonstrating usefulness in grey parrot learning
The importance of demonstrating the utility of referential communication to parrot
learners is evidenced by the results of different studies conducted by Irene Pepperberg
and Nicolas Giret et al. Although both labs aimed to train grey parrots in acquiring words,
the grey parrots in Giret et al.’s experiments did not succeed in learning the referential
use of labels to the same extent as the parrots in Pepperberg’s lab.31
In a 2010 study, Giret et al. found that parrots did not acquire referential labels
well when they were trained using their Repetition/Association method involving social
interaction but without initially demonstrating the functionality of those labels.32 The
Repetition/Association method involved two phases. First, in the Repetition phase, an
experimenter repeatedly vocalizes the label in the absence of the item. This phase is
designed to prompt vocal imitation of the word itself. For example, during the Repetition
phase, an experimenter would repeat the word “rouleau” (the French word for a
cardboard roll) without showing the parrot any cardboard rolls. Next, in the Association
phase, after the parrot spontaneously imitates the word “rouleau,” the experimenter
would reward this vocalization for a few days by giving a cardboard roll to the parrot,
thus associating the label “rouleau” with its corresponding item, a cardboard roll.33 This
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Repetition/Association method involves social interaction with a single experimenter,
though this social context is not as rich as it would be with multiple experimenters. Note
also that the referentiality and functionality of the label is not demonstrated for the entire
first phase of this method. Thus, during the Repetition phase, the parrot is repeatedly
exposed to the label, under conditions with social interaction but no demonstrated
functionality (or referentiality). Giret et al. conducted an experiment in which two grey
parrots were taught labels using the Repetition/Association method. They found that
although one parrot, Shango, learned to imitate 7 trained labels, he only associated 3 of
those 7 labels with their corresponding items.34 The other parrot in the experiment did
not learn to imitate any of the labels.
Note that the Giret et al. studies did not test for referential use of labels; instead
they tested whether parrots could associate the label to its corresponding item and
vocalize the label when shown the item and asked what it is.35 I observe that such a test
does not distinguish between a subject understanding the referential meaning of the
label and a subject having a mere stimulus-response association between object and
label. Passing the association test alone cannot demonstrate that a subject understands
the meaning of the label. Such a test can show that a parrot can consistently associate
an object and its label, but it cannot show that the parrot understands what that label
means. However, if a subject does comprehend the label’s meaning, the subject would
be able to pass the association test. Thus, although passing the test would not warrant a
conclusion that the subject acquired comprehension and truly referential use of the
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labels, we can interpret from the failure to demonstrate correct association that the
subject did not acquire referential use.
Compare the Giret et al. result with Pepperberg’s subject, Alex, who was never
trained to imitate labels for items but rather was shown how people use labels to
communicate about corresponding items. Although there was some success with
Shango, who learned to associate 3 labels with the correct objects, the fact that he could
not associate 4 of 7 labels he learned with their corresponding items is noteworthy. On
my interpretation, the Repetition phase of the Repetition/Association method could have
had a chilling effect on the ability of Giret et al.’s parrot subjects to learn the referentiality
and functionality of those labels. In divorcing the label from its item during the Repetition
phase, the method fails to demonstrate the functionality and usefulness of
communicating with labels. Labels are first presented as mere sounds, without function
or context. It may be difficult and inefficient to establish its functional value later, by
associating it with an item, especially then without explicitly showing how the label
functions through reference.
In a 2002 study, Pepperberg found that two grey parrots (Alo and Kyaaro)
acquired referential labels when training involved demonstrating reference and function
within a social context.36 According to Pepperberg, they learned more effectively when
given “referential, contextually applicable (functional) and socially rich input.”37 Since
labels are functional because of how they refer meaningfully, it makes sense that these
properties must be demonstrated for the labels to be acquired and used properly.
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To acquire referential communication, it is important to show learners how to use
words to communicate meaningfully. Additionally, it may be important that this
functionality be presented when the words are introduced. In this way, learners can
observe that vocalized words are not merely sounds, but rather are vehicles for
communication. Words are most effectively used to communicate meaningfully with
others, not merely to repeat or imitate without context or understanding. In other words,
it seems critical to demonstrate to a learner that referential communication is useful,
perhaps for getting something you need or desire, and is not merely an exercise in
sound-making.
2.5 The significance of social context in grey parrot learning
The importance of social context in learning to use referential communication is
evidenced by the success of the Pepperberg lab’s training regimen. Additionally, several
research studies provide evidence that these conditions are needed to train grey parrots
to use words. Parrots do not learn to use referential labels when training is attempted
without social interaction. In the 2002 study, Pepperberg showed that two grey parrots
could be trained to use referential labels only if training involved social interaction with a
trainer.38 Both parrots failed to acquire the referential use of labels trained in conditions
without social interaction, even when the referentiality and functionality of the labels was
shown. However, when the same two parrots were taught under interactive Model/Rival
training conditions, they acquired the use of referential labels. Similar results were found
in a 2010 study by Giret et al., in which audio recordings of labels were repeatedly

38

Pepperberg, “Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots.”

34

played to grey parrots in the absence of human interaction.39 Neither of the two parrot
subjects learned any labels played back to them in this way, although both were capable
of learning such vocalizations. Each parrot learned to vocalize other labels that were
taught to them using methods involving human interaction.40
Furthermore, the Pepperberg 2002 study suggested that modelling may be
needed to prompt the vocal production of labels. Another grey parrot named Griffin
received 50 training sessions under referential, functional, and interactive conditions with
a single trainer. Although the trainer interacted with Griffin, the use of labels was not fully
modelled. With a single trainer, Griffin could observe the trainer vocalizing words, but did
not observe multiple users engaged in two-way communication. After 50 of these
sessions, Griffin did not produce labels until after he saw the use of labels being
modelled after a couple of Model/Rival sessions. Pepperberg believes that Griffin did
acquire understanding of the labels during the 50 initial single-trainer sessions, even
though he did not vocalize or use them himself.41 If so, then exposure to multiple people
modelling the use of referential communication may induce learners to start actively
using words they may have silently learned.
Thus, not only is social interaction critical for grey parrots learning referential
labels, it also seems that modelling is an effective driver of the vocal production of those
labels. The parrot subjects in Pepperberg lab’s learned to use labels within a rich social
context in which they socialized and learned to communicate with humans using words.
2.6 The significance of exposure in grey parrot learning
Giret et al., “Referential Learning of French and Czech Labels in African Grey Parrots
(Psittacus Erithacus),” 95.
40 Giret et al., “Referential Learning of French and Czech Labels in African Grey Parrots
(Psittacus Erithacus).”
41 Pepperberg, “Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots,” 85.
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This condition requires that the parrot not only be exposed to the referential
communication in particular ways but also in a sufficient amount and frequency. When
Alex the parrot started his training, he received 1-2 Model/Rival sessions each day in the
Pepperberg lab. Sessions were typically 60 minutes long; under these conditions, Alex
learned labels very successfully.42 Other grey parrots who had received 50 noninteractive training sessions in the Pepperberg lab needed 20 interactive Model/Rival
sessions before they produced labels.43 Shango, a parrot in the Giret et al. French lab,
received 1-2 Model/Rival sessions per week for 6 months, with each session ranging
from 20-60 minutes, but Shango did not learn to produce the label under these training
conditions.44 However, in later experiments, Shango was able to learn other labels he
was taught using socially interactive training methods with more frequent exposure.45
So, it seems that frequent exposure to the functionality and referentiality of labels in a
rich, socially interactive context is needed for parrots to use these words to
communicate.
Based on my analysis of Pepperberg’s and Giret et al.’s research results, I
hypothesize that grey parrots need appropriate exposure approximately every day. For
Shango the parrot, who was capable of learning trained labels, 1-2 sessions per week
were not enough (ranging from 20-120 minutes total per week). In a later experiment,
Giret et al. found that Shango could learn to vocalize trained labels with 5 days per week
of exposure (at least 45 minutes each day), using various methods with social
interaction, including Model/Rival. Although Shango learned to produce 10 labels under
42
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these conditions, he did not demonstrate that he could consistently and correctly
associate 7 of them to the appropriate items.46 It is not clear to me whether his failure to
acquire referential use of these labels is due to insufficient exposure, a lack of sufficient
motivation, or other factors.
Thus, I have shown that the four conditions are critical for grey parrots to acquire
the referential use of human words. When one of the conditions is not met, the subject
does not learn to use the word.
Section 3: Accordance with humans
The MUSE model also applies to human language learning. Humans have
demonstrated the capacity to acquire linguistic referential communication when the
MUSE conditions are satisfied.
3.1 Motivation in language-learning
Being sufficiently motivated to learn to communicate, perhaps due to a desire to
interact socially with language-users, seems to be a natural part of how humans acquire
language. Mere exposure to language is not sufficient for acquisition of a second
language. Indeed, Gardner and Lambert found that success in acquiring a second
language depended not only on linguistic aptitude, but also on motivation, which was
specifically characterized as “a willingness to be like valued members of the language
community.”47 They concluded that the same kind of motivation is needed both in first
and second language acquisition, in accordance with Mowrer’s theory that children
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acquire language because they identify with family members and are motivated to be
like them.48
The significance of motivation as a factor is evident in how educators have noted
that students may not learn a second language as quickly as their first language when
they are not motivated by the necessity to communicate. In such cases, there needs to
be another strong motivation to learn the language. Elley and Mangubhai write, "The
[second language] learner already has a perfectly good language to communicate his or
her needs; hence there is a greater dependence on extrinsic (or instrumental) motivation
to learn the language."49
3.2 Usefulness shown in language-learning
When we observe people communicating linguistically, we can see how
vocalizations (or other symbols) with referential meaning can make a social difference.
People use meaningful expressions to communicate with others, thereby achieving
coordination or other goals. Language is useful in large part because of its referentiality.
When language has word-referent relationships that are stable enough to be used to
coordinate meaning, speakers can communicate successfully with each other using
words. Reference allows a speaker to transmit a message and have the message be
understood by listeners who understand those meanings. Thus, it is important for a
language-learner to understand how words function via the way they refer. Since
language is the way people can communicate with each other and coordinate behaviour,
a learner needs to see the functional value of such referentiality.

Gardner and Lambert, “Motivational Variables in Second-Language Acquisition.”
Warwick B. Elley and Francis Mangubhai, “The Impact of Reading on Second Language
Learning,” Reading Research Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1983): 54, https://doi.org/10.2307/747337.
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3.3 Social context in language-learning
Humans are exposed to language in a social context that is richly interactive.
Communication is a social activity, involving communicators transmitting messages to
others. It is important to see language at work in its native context, which is social by
nature, to observe and understand what it is and how it works. This condition occurs
naturally for most human infants when they are raised in environments in which family
members speak with each other using language. Indeed, human infants raised in
bilingual environments where they are exposed to two languages will acquire both
languages as well as monolingual infants who acquire only a single language.50 An
example of language exposure that does not meet this condition would be hearing an
audio recording of a single person speaking.
To fully understand how language works, the learner needs to see it functioning
in context, so the learner can interpret the situational context and learn how the words
relate to that context. Modelling language use in a social group may be especially
significant since it allows the learner to observe communicators exchanging roles
(between speaker and listener), which may aid in seeing oneself as a language user.
Such modelling can show that language is not merely a vehicle for monologues from a
privileged speaker to passive listeners, but rather a tool to be used for two-way
communication by different users who take on both speaking and listening roles.
Educators have noted that formal second-language training may be inferior to
first-language exposure in this way. Second-language classes may be artificial and
restricted in context, whereas first-language exposure occurs in a rich social context with
Ágnes Melinda Kovács and Jacques Mehler, “Flexible Learning of Multiple Speech Structures
in Bilingual Infants,” Science 325, no. 5940 (2009): 611–612.
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events, behaviours, facial expressions, and intonations. Unsurprisingly, research
confirms that children readily acquire language in such contexts, as "studies of
vocabulary acquisition in [first-language] learning also indicate that children learn many
new words naturally from context, and less effectively from deliberate drilling."51 The
implication is that learners can acquire language better if it occurs in a natural and
variable context, such as the way languages are naturally used by competent speakers
in our social environments.
3.4 Exposure to language
In practice, it is difficult to acquire language without sufficient exposure. By
“sufficient” exposure, I mean that the learner is repeatedly, frequently and regularly
exposed to the language. If the subject has a critical period for language-acquisition,
then exposure must occur during this critical period. There is evidence that humans must
be exposed to their first language within a critical period to fully acquire linguistic skills.52
One child who was neglected without language exposure until age 6 was able to speak
normally by age 7. In contrast, another child who was abused and had no language
exposure until age 13 was unable to develop normal language skills beyond that of a
typical 2-year-old. While more research would be needed to establish a conclusive
claim, it may be that the critical period for language exposure ends sometime between
ages 6 and 13 for humans.53
It makes sense that regular exposure is also needed to acquire additional
languages. Second-language learning often occurs most efficiently when the learner is
Elley and Mangubhai, “The Impact of Reading on Second Language Learning,” 55.
Lila R. Gleitman and Elissa L. Newport, “The Invention of Language by Children: Environmental
and Biological Influences on the Acquisition of Language,” An Invitation to Cognitive Science 1
(1995): 1–24.
53 Gleitman and Newport.
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immersed in that language environment. Indeed, when regular exposure to a second
language stops, we may lose vocabulary we formerly had. Second language learners
may forget a language they had acquired in the past if they are not consistently exposed
to it. Consistent exposure is necessary even for people learning new vocabulary in their
native language. Speakers may forget uncommon words if they are not regularly
exposed to them.
Section 4: Corroborating evidence from dolphins
In this section, I consider evidence that the MUSE model also applies to dolphins
learning to communicate referentially.
4.1 Dolphins can learn referential communication
Research shows that dolphins can also learn to understand a human-created
language. Over many years, Louis Herman and other researchers trained two dolphins
to understand simple sentences and use labels in a language developed by the
researchers. The research program was designed to train and test the dolphins on
perception and comprehension. The researchers used two kinds of artificial languages;
one was an acoustic language using whistle-like sounds while the other language used
gestures.
Both artificial languages used by Herman et al. used referential symbols to
denote objects (e.g., PIPE, FRISBEE), modifiers (e.g., SURFACE, BOTTOM), or actions
(e.g., SPIT, TAIL-TOUCH). Each language had its own set of rules for constructing
sentences. A simple two-word command to the dolphin to execute an action to a
particular object would take the form of {Object + Action}. For example, the sentence
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expressing “HOOP UNDER“ gives the instruction “Go to the hoop and swim under it.”54
Longer sentences could be constructed according to the language’s grammatical rules.
In the acoustic language taught to Phoenix, a five-word sentence would take the form of
{Modifier + Direct Object + Action + Modifier + Indirect Object}.55 Note that a different
sequencing of symbols changes the meaning of the sentence. For example, the
sentence “BOTTOM FRISBEE FETCH SURFACE HOOP” expresses the instruction,
“Go to the frisbee at the bottom of the tank and take it to the hoop at the surface.”56 In
contrast, the sentence “SURFACE HOOP FETCH BOTTOM FRISBEE” means “Go to
the hoop at the surface and take it to the frisbee at the bottom.” Thus, both artificial
languages used by Herman et al. had its own consistent grammar. Individuals who
understand the language’s rules could understand the meaning of novel sentences in
that language.
At the Kewalo Basin Marine Mammal Laboratory at the University of Hawaii,
Herman, Richards, and Wolz showed that two wild-caught Atlantic bottle-nosed dolphins
could learn to understand commands expressed in an artificial language.57 Both dolphins
were females, captured off the Mississippi coast as juveniles when they were roughly 2
to 3 years old. After 30 days acclimating to captivity in Mississippi, they were brought to
the lab at the University of Hawaii. In the next 7 months, researchers prepared the two
dolphins for language comprehension training by socializing them toward humans and
familiarizing them with sounds, gestures, and objects. Herman et al. explain that during
this pre-language training phase, "attention was given to socializing the pair toward
Louis M. Herman, Douglas G. Richards, and James P. Wolz, “Comprehension of Sentences by
Bottlenosed Dolphins,” Cognition 16, no. 2 (March 1984): 146, https://doi.org/10.1016/00100277(84)90003-9.
55 Herman, Richards, and Wolz, 146–47.
56 Herman, Richards, and Wolz, 152.
57 Herman, Richards, and Wolz, “Comprehension of Sentences by Bottlenosed Dolphins.”
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humans... To promote an affiliative response towards humans, the authors and others of
the staff swam daily with the pair, hand fed them, stroked them, and engaged them in
games such as 'tag’… or ‘retrieve’."58
When Herman et al. began training the dolphins, each dolphin was taught a
different language in a different mode. One dolphin, Akeakamai, was trained to
understand a gestural language by observing the human trainer’s arm and hand
movements. The other dolphin, Phoenix, was trained to understand the acoustic
language of whistle-like sounds played through an underwater speaker. Subsequently,
both dolphins successfully followed commands expressed in sentences they had not
encountered before. Thus, they demonstrated that they could comprehend novel
sentences in the artificial language taught to them.59
Richards, Wolz, and Herman also successfully trained Akeakamai to use
referential labels in the other language, the acoustic language based on whistle-like
sounds. Akeakamai correctly associated labels with their referent and could vocalize the
correct label when presented with the appropriate object.60 Of the five labels that
Akeakamai was trained to use, three were also being used to train Phoenix on
comprehension. Notably, Akeakamai was present when Phoenix was trained in sound
comprehension. According to Richards, Wolz, and Herman, “It is possible that the small
amount of prior training of Akeakamai in the comprehension of sounds, combined with
her presence during the continual training of Phoenix in sound comprehension…
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facilitated her learning of the labelling task.”61 Thus, dolphins can learn to comprehend
simple sentences in a human-created language and also learn to vocalize the correct
referential label for an object.
4.2 Conditions for dolphin communication-learning
On my analysis, three of the four MUSE conditions were satisfied for these
dolphins learning language. However, there was some variability in how strongly
particular conditions were fulfilled. Where a condition was not as strongly fulfilled, there
seemed to be a corresponding decrease in the quality of learning, i.e., the dolphin did
not learn it as well.
The M condition is met, since both dolphins seemed highly motivated to interact
with humans and learn the language. Starting in the pre-training phase, the dolphins
received rewards (fish) for learning simple tasks and were socialized to humans. Indeed,
Herman et al. explain, "Our goal in these initial tasks was to develop a learning set or,
more generally, a positive attitude toward learning."62 Thus, the dolphins were wellmotivated to interact, learn and receive rewards.
In terms of social motivation, although both dolphins were born in the wild, both
had been socialized to interact with humans in captivity. Human trainers touched, played
with and fed the dolphins by hand.63 Although the two dolphins were housed together in
the same tank in the Hawaii lab,64 it seems that living with a conspecific did not prevent
them from being sufficiently motivated to socialize with humans or learn a human-
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created language. This may be due to them being enculturated to humans at a
sufficiently young age, or perhaps because the two dolphins preferred to interact with
more than one other individual. In the wild, the dolphins would likely have been part of
much larger groups at least some of the time; having only one other creature to interact
with may not have been sufficient to meet their social needs.
With respect to the U condition, it is unclear how much the usefulness of the
language’s referentiality was demonstrated to the dolphins. On one hand, trainers
demonstrated to the dolphins that the language was useful through feedback given to
the dolphins for their responses. During tests, the dolphins would receive positive
reinforcement for perfect responses; the tankside trainer would pet the dolphin and feed
the dolphin a fish. Dolphins were not rewarded for responses that were incorrect in any
way; instead, the dolphin was given an acoustic signal to return to the trainer, who would
give no response.65 Thus, the dolphins could learn the importance of distinguishing the
meanings of different labels, as well as the importance of responding correctly to the
commands expressed by different sentences, both for getting a fish reward and also for
getting positive interaction with the trainer. However, such feedback does not
demonstrate the utility of the language’s referentiality in itself. Rather, it seems that
these rewards endow indirect, instrumental value to the correct completion of tasks
(which require successful understanding and production of labels) without showing the
functional value of the referential labels themselves. It is not clear whether the dolphins
understood how referential labels themselves could be used to get desired outcomes,
since the dolphins did not use them in this way (in contrast to Pepperberg’s parrot
subject Alex.)
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The S condition is met, as Phoenix and Akeakamai were trained in a social
context with trainers present. This is especially true for Akeakamai, who learned directly
from a trainer gesturing with arms and hands. In the same day, formal training and
testing sessions would be alternated with highly interactive sessions with a trainer at the
side of the tank.66 Although the formal sessions themselves were not so richly
interactive, the larger context involved social interaction. As well, since the two dolphins
were housed in the same tank, they were present during each other’s sessions.67 It is
possible that the dolphins could observe and learn from the other’s sessions.
It seems also that the E condition was met, as subjects were regularly exposed
to the language being trained. The dolphins regularly received 2 sessions per day for 5-6
days each week. Each session was two to three hours in length, of which roughly half
the time involved language practice, training, and testing. The other half of the time
involved play and other interactive activities with the tankside trainer.68 Thus, each
dolphin would have received roughly two to three hours of language exposure daily, 5-6
days per week.
In summary, several of the MUSE conditions were met in training dolphins to
communicate using language. The motivation and exposure conditions were strongly
met in both cases. The demonstrated usefulness of reference condition was not directly
met. The social context condition was met more strongly in Akeakamai’s training than in
Phoenix’s case.
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4.3 Reconsidering the social context condition
One might notice that Phoenix was not trained within a social context, since
Phoenix was trained to understand the acoustic language with computer-generated
sounds played through a speaker. Although a human trainer was present during tests,
the trainer was not using the acoustic language, and thus not interacting in the specific
context of the language. Despite the lack of an interactive social context while learning
the language, Phoenix still learned to comprehend sentences in the language. Thus,
Phoenix’s acoustic language training involved less social interaction than Akeakamai’s
gestural language training.
The dolphins’ conditions for learning language and relative success corroborate
the MUSE model, given that Phoenix’s performance declined relative to Akeakamai’s
performance. In a later study, Herman noted that although Phoenix initially performed
highly in sentence comprehension tasks from 1981-1983, her performance successively
declined in later years, in 1984 and 1985.69 Phoenix’s decline in performance lies in
contrast to Akeakamai’s performance during the same time period, which remained
stable from 1981-1985. Moreover, Herman found Phoenix’s relative decline to be
“puzzling”, given that dolphins are auditory specialists who often learn auditory tasks
more easily than visual tasks.70 He considered the hypothesis that these social
differences in the training of the two dolphins accounted for their differences in long-term
retention. Herman writes, “Although Phoenix also interacts socially with her trainer, her
acoustic sentences come from the impersonal underwater speaker located away from
Louis M. Herman, “Receptive Competencies of Language-Trained Animals,” in Advances in the
Study of Behavior, ed. Colin Beer Jay S. Rosenblatt Marie-Claire Busnel and Peter J. B. Slater,
vol. Volume 17 (Academic Press, 1987), 37,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065345408601758.
70 Herman, 35–36.
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the trainer. ”71 He also considered other possible explanations for Phoenix’s relative
decline, including the fact that they were different animals, that Phoenix had declined
intellectually in general, that her motivation had declined, and that the different grammar
in her language accounted for her performance decline. However, aside from
interindividual variability, Herman ruled out the other hypotheses since they were
inconsistent with observations.72
Let us consider how such a difference in learning context could affect the
acquisition of language. Since communication is a social phenomenon, it may help to
see others using the language. Furthermore, it may help with learning to observe
multiple different individuals communicating with language. In the case of Akeakamai,
different trainers would make the gestures at different times. In this way, she could
observe the same signs being gestured in slightly different ways, depending on the
individual. For example, more experienced trainers might sign more quickly, whereas
novices would make gestures less fluidly. Indeed, Herman et al. write that “for
Akeakamai, the variability in the signs across trainers appeared to promote her
identification, for each sign, of the key components that were used in common by all
trainers.”73 If Akeakamai was better able to learn the relevant components of the signs
through observing different individuals using the language, her understanding and
knowledge of the language may have been better solidified. Thus, I suggest that the lack
of a socially interactive context while learning is the best remaining explanation for
Phoenix’s failure to retain comprehension of her acoustic language. Note that, in
Pepperberg’s research, Alex the parrot was also able to observe a similar diversity of
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communicators during the Model/Rival training, as different experimenters would play
the roles of teacher and model, then switch roles.
On my analysis, the dolphin studies at the Kewalo Basin Marine Mammal lab
corroborate the MUSE model in another animal species beyond grey parrots and
humans. Sufficient exposure and motivation are critical for acquiring referential
communication. As well, the difference between Phoenix’s and Akeakamai’s long-term
retention of words underscores the significance of learning within a social context. Since
the dolphin studies did not explicitly demonstrate the usefulness of language’s
referentiality, these studies do not shed light on its importance for dolphins learning
language.
One possibility may be that explicit demonstrations of the usefulness of reference
is more important when the subject is unfamiliar with referential communication (as in
learning a first language). If so, then it may not be as important to demonstrate the
usefulness of referentiality for learning second or successive languages or systems of
referential communication in general. An individual who already knows how to use one
system of referential communication may already understand the usefulness of
referentiality via experience, and thus may not need its usefulness to be demonstrated
anew.
In any case, the MUSE model applies not only to humans and parrots, and also
not only to vocalized words but also words in other modalities, as evidenced by the
gestural language taught to Akeakamai.
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Section 5: Corroborating evidence from other species in nature
Thus far, I have demonstrated that the MUSE model applies to humans and
some non-human animals learning human forms of referential communication. The
Herman and Pepperberg labs represented socio-ecological contexts in which it was
highly beneficial for dolphins and parrots, respectively, to acquire referential
communication. Their research showed that these animals have a powerfully flexible
ability to learn to communicate in ways that are distinct from their species-typical
behaviours, with animals who are very different from them (i.e., humans). In this section,
I consider corroborating evidence that the MUSE model also applies to other nonhuman
animals learning to communicate in referentially specific ways in nature.
5.1 Vervet monkey alarm calls
Vervet monkeys use distinct alarm calls when encountering different predators.
In terms of productional specificity, vervet monkeys have been shown to produce six
different alarm call types in response to six categories of predators (leopards and other
cats, eagles, pythons and poisonous snakes, minor mammalian predators, unfamiliar
humans, and baboons).74 For the leopard alarm type, there are two different calls: male
vervets produce loud barks upon detecting a leopard, while females produce a single
high chirp. Vervet monkeys who hear the different types of alarm calls respond
behaviourally in ways that help to evade danger from that particular predator type. Thus,
vervets also demonstrate perceptual specificity in their alarm calls. In response to
leopard alarm calls, vervets run into trees, whereas they look upwards or run into bushes
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in response to eagle alarm calls.75 Upon hearing snake alarm calls, they stand up on two
feet and vigilantly look in the grass, and sometimes mob the snake. For alarms signalling
minor mammalian predators such as jackals, hyenas, lions and cheetahs, they become
vigilant, watch the predator and move slowly to trees. Thus, vervet monkeys evince both
productional and perceptual specificity in their alarm calls.
The MUSE model plausibly applies to vervet monkeys, considering that they
grow up in a socio-ecological context in which it is beneficial and necessary to learn the
alarm calls. Young vervet monkeys observe how adults call and behave in response to
various predator stimuli. Infants often make mistakes when giving alarm calls, but as
they grow up, they eventually learn how to produce appropriate calls at appropriate
times. Vervets also learn how to respond to alarm calls. As infants, they are likely to run
to their mother when they hear alarms. As they grow older, they run less to their mother
and will often look at how adults behave before responding themselves. Young vervets
who react only after they watch an adult’s behavioural response are more likely to
respond correctly.76 Thus, vervet monkeys seem to learn their referentially specific alarm
calls in a social context, in which they are regularly exposed to alarm calls and the
appropriate evasive responses that they need to take.
Section 6: Interspecies “eavesdropping” cases
In the wild, some animals have learned to “eavesdrop” on the referential
communication of other species. That is, an individual of species X learns to understand
the calls of species Y for individual X’s own benefit.
6.1 Black-capped chickadee alarm calls and “eavesdropping” nuthatches
Robert M. Seyfarth, Dorothy L. Cheney, and Peter Marler, “Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls:
Semantic Communication in a Free-Ranging Primate,” Animal Behaviour 28, no. 4 (1980): 1070–
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Black-capped chickadees also use referentially specific alarm calls. They
produce two different types of alarm calls that encode information about the kind of
predator encounter, as well as the level of risk presented by the predator. Templeton et
al. showed that chickadees not only produce alarm calls differentiating predator size and
risk level but also that their behavioural responses differentiated between those calls.77
The researchers theorized that since chickadees are faced with predation from different
kind of raptors, but that small raptors pose the greatest risk, it would be adaptive for
chickadees to have distinct calls to indicate the different levels of risks. Templeton et al.
write, “Discriminating among morphologically similar predators within a single type (e.g.,
different species of raptors) could also be adaptive if the predators vary in the degree of
threat they pose.”78 In response to a perched aerial predator or terrestrial predator,
chickadees produce a mobbing alarm call to recruit other birds to mob the predator. The
mobbing behaviour functions to chase the predator from the area so that it does not
pose a threat to the birds.
Research shows that red-breasted nuthatches “eavesdrop” on black-capped
chickadee alarm calls and respond. Nuthatches are small birds that occupy a similar
ecological niche. Nuthatches and chickadees, along with other small bird species, often
forage in mixed-species flocks together. Templeton and Greene showed that the
nuthatches also responded most vigorously to mobbing alarms for small raptors, which
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represent a higher level of threat.79 Thus, the nuthatches demonstrated perceptual
specificity in their behavioural responses to the two types of chickadee alarm calls.
6.2 Testing the MUSE model
To determine whether the MUSE model fits the nuthatch “eavesdropping” case,
we would need to research the conditions surrounding the nuthatches.
The M dimension would be satisfied if nuthatches are incentivized by their social
or ecological context to learn the referentially specific chickadee alarms. Templeton and
Greene argue for the adaptive value of learning the chickadee alarm call system, given
food scarcity and the need to conserve energy in the winter. If nuthatches learn the
difference between the two types of chickadee alarms, they can mob the most
dangerous predators most vigorously. Moreover, Templeton and Greene point out that
nuthatches “have an even stronger incentive to attempt to drive predators away through
active mobbing” due to the small size of their wintering ranges.80 If nuthatches who learn
the referentially specific alarm calls are healthier or are more likely to survive than those
who do not learn, then the MUSE model would apply to this case as well.
Next, we would need to research how nuthatches learn the referentially specific
calls of the chickadee. We would want to determine whether and to what extent the
usefulness of the calls’ referentiality is demonstrated to nuthatches, their exposure to the
calls, and whether they learn the calls within an interactive social context. If nuthatches
learn the differentiated alarms under conditions that satisfy MUSE dimensions, then the
MUSE model also fits the case of nuthatches “eavesdropping” on chickadee calls.
Christopher N. Templeton and Erick Greene, “Nuthatches Eavesdrop on Variations in
Heterospecific Chickadee Mobbing Alarm Calls,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 104, no. 13 (March 27, 2007): 5479–82, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0605183104.
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6.3 Closing remarks
One objection to what I have proposed is that it is merely a just-so story; while
my model claims to represent a phenomenon of referential communication learning, it is
simply a tale made to fit existing observations which has no real purchase.
I would respond that my MUSE model predicts a correlation between fulfilment of
the MUSE dimensions and successful acquisition of referential communication. I have
discussed individual examples throughout this paper. To recapitulate, there are two
ways that my model can fail to fit the target: in the first case, when an animal
successfully acquires referential communication without the MUSE conditions, and
secondly, when an animal capable of referential communication fails to learn it under
conditions that do satisfy the MUSE dimensions.
In summary, I have presented a model of the acquisition of referential
communication. I have presented evidence that it fits some animals capable of
referential communication. As well, I have suggested avenues of research that would
allow us to evaluate the model’s fit to other cases of referential communication learning.
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CHAPTER 3: HOW A PARROT’S UTTERANCES COULD CLARIFY THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF MEANING
“Parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct
enough, which yet by no means are capable of language.” - John Locke81
Section 1: Background
1.1 Introduction
Parrots can talk. That is, parrots can vocalize in ways that sound like words.
Although some parrots seem merely to be mimicking human language, others appear to
use their word-like vocalizations in the same way that humans do. Indeed, a parrot
named Alex was trained to understand and use English words. Alex referentially and
functionally used words and phrases to communicate and obtain what he wanted. He
understood and responded appropriately to verbal requests. In short, he used English
words to communicate meaningfully with others, much like how a human child
communicates with words.
Alex’s demonstrated capacity for semantic communication stands in contrast to
generally held assumptions that humans are the exemplars of intelligence on Earth, that
birds are comparatively unintelligent82, and that therefore we should look to humans and
closely related animals (i.e., great apes, primates, or mammals) to understand the
capacity for linguistic communication and intelligence in general. However, given Alex
the parrot’s ability to use words meaningfully, we need to update some of our commonly
held theories and assumptions.
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In this paper, I argue that the case of Alex the parrot can give us special insight
on what’s missing in some of our philosophical accounts of meaning. According to H.
Paul Grice, linguistic meaning is grounded in speaker meaning, which is grounded by
the speaker’s reflexive communicative intention: her intention to produce a belief in the
hearer via the hearer’s recognition of such intention.83 Thus, on Grice’s theory of
meaning, Alex’s utterances cannot have speaker meaning unless he has third-order
communicative intentions. However, it seems implausible to attribute such third-order
communicative intentions to Alex the parrot. Since Grice’s theory of meaning cannot
plausibly account for simple, meaningful utterances like Alex’s, we need to look to more
minimal accounts of meaning.
Mitchell Green offers an intention-free account of meaning. On Green’s account,
individuals including nonhuman animals can communicate meaningfully without relying
on intentions or other mental states of the speaker to explain how such meaning arises.
While Green’s account sheds light on many kinds of animal signals, especially those
occurring in the wild, Alex the parrot’s communicative behaviour is much more
sophisticated than the animal signals accounted for by Green.
Specifically, Alex seems to have intentions to communicate when he speaks. So,
I consider Dorit Bar-On’s reconstruction of Grice’s theory. According to Bar-On’s
reinterpretation of Grice, speakers can speaker-mean when they produce utterances
without the need for reflexive communicative intentions if the words and phrases they
use already have conventional meaning. Only the originators of meaning need to have
Gricean communicative intentions to create meaning in the first place. Speakers can
employ conventional meaning already established in the words and symbols they use,
and do not need to have Gricean intentions. Thus, Bar-On’s account can explain how
83
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children and autistic people might use words without having sophisticated
communicative intentions.
However, I show that Alex the parrot is not simply a passive inheritor of preestablished conventional meaning. I present a case in which Alex the parrot actively
originated meaning. I argue that this case demonstrates that Bar-On’s Gricean account
still overintellectualizes the origination of meaning. Given that he communicates by using
conventional, non-natural meaning, intends to refer when he produces utterances, and
even originates meaning, Alex the parrot poses a distinctive challenge to philosophical
accounts of meaning.
Furthermore, Alex’s case presents a challenge to theories that take recursive
intention-reading as the primary driver in the development of referential symbolic
communication. Though there is no evidence that Alex engaged in recursive intentionreading, he ultimately learned not only to communicate meaningfully with humans but
also to originate meaning by coining a new label, then communicating it to a human. He
was motivated to participate in such cooperative communicative endeavours after he
was socially integrated with language-using humans. Alex thus demonstrates the
significance of sociality and motivation in prompting animals to acquire complex
communicative behaviours such as the use and creation of word-like symbols.
1.2 The utterances of Alex the parrot
Irene Pepperberg’s research showed that not only could a parrot learn to imitate
the vocalizations of humans, but also he could use words functionally and referentially.
Her subject was Alex, a captive-born grey parrot. For over thirty years, Pepperberg
trained Alex in the appropriate use of English words and phrases.84 Consequently, Alex
acquired a repertoire of English words that he used referentially and appropriately, in
84
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everyday contexts as well as in formal research sessions. He understood and used
correct labels for objects (e.g., corn, key, pasta) and their attributes (e.g., green, blue,
paper). In Pepperberg’s research, Alex demonstrated his referential use of English
words in formal tests, in which he produced correct labels for objects in 200 tests 80% of
the time.85
Not only did he acquire labels to name objects and their properties, but also he
understood and correctly used words for categories (e.g., colour, shape, material) and
other concepts (e.g. numbers, “none”). Alex could respond with the correct category
when presented with two objects and asked “What’s [the] same?” or “What’s different?”86
That he was able to give the correct category (e.g. “colour”) rather than the specific
property (e.g, “blue”) demonstrates that he understood the meaning of the words used
by himself and researchers. To correctly and reliably answer such questions, Alex
needed to understand exactly what was being asked. For example, if asked “What’s
same?” when presented with two blue objects, Alex needed to understand not only the
meaning of the question, but also the meaning of “colour” and how colour, as a category,
relates to particular perceivable colours such as blue. Since he was being asked to
respond with the category for the similar attribute, he would not have been able to pass
such a test simply by associating a particular stimulus with a certain vocal response. In
contrast, if he had been asked only to vocalize “blue” in response to two blue objects
(rather than “colour”), a simple stimulus-response association would be sufficient. If
there was no such similarity relation (or difference relation) between the two presented
objects, he would indicate the lack of similarity (or difference) by answering “none.”
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Thus, Pepperberg’s research demonstrated that Alex’s referential use of words was not
merely associative, but rather accompanied by a grasp of their meaning.
Alex used words functionally to communicate information to others. As I
discussed, he used words to give correct information about objects and their attributes.
Not only did he respond to others’ queries, but also he used words to express his own
desire for particular objects. He used the functional phrase “Want X” to request objects
he wanted, e.g., he vocalized “Want nut” to request a nut. When Alex vocalized such a
request, he meant something specific. He was not randomly vocalizing words and then
accepting whatever objects were given. On the contrary, if Alex requested a particular
item X but was given a different item Y, he would say "nuh" and repeat his request for
X.87 His rejection of unwanted objects suggests that his request was intentional and
particular. So, when he uttered “Want nut,” he intentionally uttered the word (“nut”) that
referred to the particular object he wanted (a nut), then expected to receive that specific
object. Notably, Alex often asked for items that were not in view at the time of his
request.88 Thus, his requests were independent of external stimuli; they could not have
simply been an automatic response to seeing the object X, for example. The stimulusindependent nature of his requests suggests that he had a mental representation of the
desired object, then chose the appropriate words to communicate his desire for that
object. Alex’s requesting behaviour suggests that he intended to communicate his
desire, as he expected a specific behaviour in response to his request (i.e., the
researcher fetching the requested object for Alex).
In these ways, Alex’s utterances were referential, functional, and meaningful.
Note that Alex could communicate meaningfully using words and phrases, even though

87
88

Pepperberg, The Alex Studies, 51.
Pepperberg, 51.

59

he was not trained in the full syntax of language. He was not trained to speak or
understand full grammatical sentences; rather, he was trained with a simplified form of
English. For example, researchers would ask him “What’s same?” rather than “What’s
the same?” By combining “Want” with different object labels, he could use a simplystructured phrase but in general, his utterances did not have a lot of structure. Alex
could, however, understand the meaning of individual words as well as the meaning of
words combined. He correctly answered questions that demanded sequential processing
of different parts of the question, such as “What colour is the item that is circular and
rawhide?”89 To answer such questions correctly, he needed to understand all that was
being asked; he had to find the object that fulfilled all queried properties (e.g., circular
and rawhide), and then identify the colour of that object. Alex comprehended such
simply-structured questions, which he demonstrated by giving correct answers over 81%
of the time on first trials.90 While there was some syntactic complexity in his
comprehension of English words, he certainly did not produce utterances with a complex
hierarchical recursive structure.
To summarize, Alex’s capacity for the comprehension and functional use of
English words might be compared to that of a two-year-old human child. In the same
way that a child uttering words is meaningful though unsophisticated, Alex’s utterances
were likewise meaningful. He spoke words in appropriate contexts, using them to make
requests and answer questions. His utterances functioned in much the same way as if
they were uttered by human children. He demonstrated a consistent understanding and
use of word-meanings. When Alex produced utterances, his utterances were meaningful
and he meant something by them.
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In what follows, I discuss Grice’s account of speaker meaning so that we can
interrogate Grice’s theory in light of Alex’s meaningful utterances.
Section 2: Assessing Grice’s theory of meaning
2.1 Grice on meaning
Grice distinguishes natural from nonnatural meaning. Whereas nonnatural
meaning arises from a speaker’s intention to communicate with an audience, natural
meaning arises from the way that things are in the world. Natural meaning is inherent in
natural signs. In Grice’s example, “those spots mean measles”91 simply because spots
are a natural sign of measles. Reddish-brown spots on the skin are a symptom – or a
regular consequence – of having measles. Thus, natural meaning arises naturally from
constant conjunctions in the external world, whereas nonnatural meaning arises more
arbitrarily from the internal mental states of communicators.
On a Gricean account of nonnatural meaning, a speaker means something by
her utterance when she intends to induce a particular belief in the recipient via the
recipient’s recognition of such intention. According to Grice, for a speaker S to mean
something while uttering x, the following conditions must be met:
[S] must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and [S] must also intend
his utterance to be recognized as so intended…[and] the recognition is intended
by [S] to play its part in inducing the belief.92
The third condition specifies that the communicative intention must do work in producing
the desired effect in the audience. Grice requires that the communicative intention must
not be “idle.”

91
92

Grice, “Meaning,” 377.
Grice, 383.

61

To illustrate the significance of having a non-idle communicative intention in
nonnatural meaning, Grice provides an example. In Case 1, the communicator S shows
Mr. X a photograph of Mr. Y in a compromising position with Mrs. X (Mr. X’s wife). In
Case 2, S draws a picture of the same scene and shows it to Mr. X. Grice notes that, in
Case 1, S’s utterance (of showing the photo to Mr. X) lacks nonnatural meaning,
because the information about Mr. Y and Mrs. X’s behaviour could be conveyed
regardless of S’s intentions.93 In Case 1, S’s communicative intention is idle; therefore
S’s utterance lacks nonnatural meaning. In contrast, S’s utterance in Case 2 does have
nonnatural meaning since the information is conveyed due to Mr. X’s recognition that S
intends to communicate such information via the drawing. Without such recognition, Mr.
X could interpret S as drawing a meaningless doodle or an imagined scenario. In other
words, the desired effect could not obtain without the audience’s recognition of the
speaker’s overt communicative intention. Via such reflexive communicative intentions,
speakers invest their utterances with nonnatural meaning. The speaker has a third-order
intention; she intends that the hearer recognizes her intention to induce an effect in the
hearer. The speaker S intends for the hearer H to believe something by having H
recognize that S intends this effect on H. On the other side, H must recognize that S
intends to produce a belief in him via this intention. Thus, for Grice, nonnatural meaning
is characterized by reflexive communicative intentions.
2.2 Concerns about Grice’s overintellectualization
Grice’s conditions for speaker meaning require speakers to have recursivelystructured thoughts about others’ mental states. Specifically, the speaker S has a higherorder mental state (intention) about the hearer’s H’s mental state (recognition) about S’s
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mental state (intention) to change H’s mental state (belief). In this section, I consider the
worry that Grice’s theory makes excessive demands on the psychology of
communicators who mean something by their utterances.
One reading of Grice is that he requires speakers to always have such reflexive
communicative intentions to mean something by their utterances. If this is the case, then
the general concern is that Grice overintellectualizes a simple phenomenon. On this
reading, to fulfill Gricean conditions for meaning, speakers would need to have multiple
(i.e., first-order, third-order) communicative intentions regarding their audience while
speaking. This picture seems unrealistic, first, because it does not reflect many people’s
experience of their mental processes while they speak. A defender of this view might
respond that speakers do not explicitly experience these communicative intentions
because these processes are occurring at a subconscious level. Even at a subconscious
level, this picture is implausible, for it would be extremely cognitively demanding for such
processes to occur as rapidly and fluidly as the speed of conversation, at the same time
as speakers are experiencing other conscious thoughts, calculations and other mental
processes in the course of conversation. Thus, in everyday speech, it seems implausible
to posit that speakers hold full Gricean intentions. As Dorit Bar-On points out, “the more
complex the intentions are, the less feasible it would seem to regard them as involved in
actual ordinary speech situations.”94 To be charitable, we should reject such an
implausible interpretation and consider another interpretation of Grice’s theory.
Alternatively, we could interpret Grice’s conditions as requiring only that speakers
be capable of having reflexive communication intentions, not that speakers must have
such intentions in every instance of speaker meaning. Thus, speakers could explain their
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utterances in terms of communicative intentions if they so wanted. On this view,
speakers would need to have a sophisticated third-order theory of mind that allows them
to have Gricean communicative intentions.
Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states to others. An individual with
theory of mind can understand others in terms of their mental states, such as beliefs,
intentions, desires, and emotions.95 A person S with a second-order theory of mind can
attribute to others not only first-order mental states (e.g. beliefs) but also second-order
mental states (e.g. beliefs about beliefs). In other words, with a second-order theory of
mind, S can attribute first-order theory of mind (i.e., second-order mental states) to other
agents. With a third-order theory of mind, S can attribute second-order theory of mind
(i.e., third-order mental states) to other individuals. Since Gricean communicative
intentions involve attributing third-order mental states to others, Grice’s theory requires
speakers to have a third-order theory of mind at minimum. Given that adult humans
typically have this ability, this interpretation of Grice’s theory of speaker meaning seems
plausible for the typical adult human speaker.
2.3 Speakers excluded by Grice’s theory
However, Grice’s account problematically excludes people who plausibly mean
when they speak yet lack the sophisticated theory of mind needed for Gricean
communicative intentions, e.g., children. Children’s speech may be simplified; children
may speak with limited vocabulary and grammar and be more likely to make errors.
Despite any differences in speech patterns, when children produce utterances, they
mean something. They use words and phrases functionally to express their desires and
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otherwise communicate, as typical adults do. In speaking, they attempt to achieve their
desires or goals. The words they use have intentionality: the words refer to objects,
characteristics, events, or other things. There is normativity in the utterances of children.
If the child points to her vegetarian dessert and says “dog,” it makes sense to correct the
child and let her know that the item is a dessert, and not a dog. The child can
understand that she had used the wrong word when attempting to label the item and
perhaps learn the correct word.
Such speakers may have specific intentions to communicate when producing
utterances. Indeed, even a child’s single-syllable utterance could be an attempt to
express a proposition.96 This point can be illustrated with a real-life example in which an
infant says “Zert!” to her mother. While the exact meaning of the infant’s utterance may
be difficult to determine (since the infant cannot use language to fully express herself
yet), she likely means something via her utterance. Perhaps she means to express that
a particular item is a dessert or that she wants her mother to give her a dessert. In the
real-life scenario, the latter seemed to hold; the infant was not satisfied when her mother
merely affirmed that the item was indeed a dessert but rather she only became satisfied
after she was given dessert and allowed to eat it.97 Thus, for the child to mean
something by her utterance, it seems unnecessary that she must be able to intend to
make her mother believe that she wants dessert by having her mother recognize the
child’s intention to make her believe such. On the contrary, the child could simply intend
to induce her mother to give her dessert. While this goal is accomplished by the means
of communicating her desire via her utterance, it is not necessary for the infant to intend
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that her mother understand this goal by recognizing the relationships between the goal,
the intention, and the utterance.
Moreover, Grice’s theory is empirically implausible, since research shows that
young children have yet to develop the theory of mind capability needed to have such a
Gricean intention. Some research suggests that children may not develop second-order
theory of mind and represent second-order beliefs in others until age 6.98 Others believe
that children develop a second-order theory of mind at age 3 or 4. Though it is unclear
when humans develop the third-order theory of mind ability required by Gricean theory, it
stands to reason that it occurs after they develop a second-order theory of mind ability.
Since 2-year-old children do not plausibly have a third-order theory of mind, Grice’s
theory cannot account for how they mean when they speak. In this way, Grice’s theory
fails to account for speakers who mean something when they produce utterances, yet
plausibly lack a third-order theory of mind, e.g., young children. Therefore, we need an
account of speaker meaning that does not require a third-order theory of mind. Such a
theory could include young children who mean when they speak, as well as Alex the
parrot.
Section 3: Nonhuman animal communication
So far, I have argued that Grice’s account of non-natural speaker meaning
cannot plausibly account for the full population of humans who mean when they speak.
So we need a theory of meaning that can account for the meaningful utterances of
children, as well as Alex the parrot. In what follows, I consider the communication of
parrots, birds, and other nonhuman animals in nature in relation to theories of meaning.
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3.1 Diversity in parrot vocalizations
In the wild and in captivity, parrots are known for their intelligence and vocal
ability. Notably, parrots are vocal learners, who can learn new vocalizations throughout
their lives, unlike most songbirds, who can only learn vocally at a particular age or
season.99 As well, parrots vocalize in a variety of contexts which suggests functions
beyond those for territory defence and mate attraction.
Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) in the wild have demonstrated a diverse vocal
repertoire. In one study, grey parrots were observed in the Central African Republic and
Cameroon making over thirty different kinds of call types that serve different functions.100
They had at least two contact call types used to establish vocal contact and distance
with conspecifics.101 They used a distress call that elicited the approach of a parent,
mate or other conspecifics.102 They had agonistic protest calls that displayed
aggression. As well, they used a flight call, alarm calls, warble sequences and calls for
engaging in pair duets. Thus, the parrots use differentiated calls that serve various
functions.
Grey parrots have also been observed in Zaire imitating sounds from other
species. Cruickshank et al.103 observed a pair producing vocalizations similar to those of
other species. From sonogram analysis, Cruickshank et al. found that these
vocalizations appeared to be imitations of calls from different species: one call from a bat
and ten calls from 9 different bird species. Although it is possible that they achieved
Diana Lynn May, “The Vocal Repertoire of Grey Parrots (Psittacus Erithacus) Living in the
Congo Basin” (PhD diss., The University of Arizona, 2004), 19,
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similar vocalizations either by convergent evolution or by chance, Cruickshank et al.
believe that the number and complexity of the calls suggests that the parrots were
indeed mimicking their heterospecifics. Significantly, all the bird species proposed as
models also live in Zaire and west-central Africa, in the same geographic area in which
the grey parrots inhabit. It is likely that the parrots would have encountered these
species and heard their calls. Thus, parrots are capable of learning diverse
vocalizations, including heterospecific calls.
3.2 Meaningful communication in nonhuman animals
Scientific research shows that nonhuman animals use meaningful
communication systems with referential specificity. Demonstrating referential specificity
in a call involves two components: first, demonstrating productional specificity in that
specific information is encoded into the signal by the caller, and secondly, demonstrating
perceptual specificity in that the encoded information is perceived by other animals who
hear the call, upon which they can then take appropriate evasive action.104
Black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla) use alarm calls that exhibit both
productional and perceptual specificity. Their alarm calls encode information about the
kind of predator encounter, as well as the level of risk presented by the predator.105
They use one call type for rapidly-moving predators and another call type for stationary
predators, with variations in the stationary predator alarm call that encode information
about the predator size and risk level. Research shows that chickadees not only produce
alarm calls that differentiate between such predators, but also that their behavioural
responses differentiated between those calls. Chickadees responded with more intense
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mobbing behaviour when they heard the alarm call for small (high-risk) raptors than for
larger (lower-risk) predators.106 Researchers hypothesized that since chickadees are
faced with predation from different kinds of raptors, it may be adaptive for them to
differentiate between high-risk predators and lower-risk predators, “Discriminating
among morphologically similar predators within a single type (e.g., different species of
raptors) could also be adaptive if the predators vary in the degree of threat they pose.”107
Research conducted by Cheney and Seyfarth demonstrated that vervet monkeys
also use referentially specific alarm calls when encountering different types of predators.
Vervets vocalize different call types upon encountering leopards, eagles, and snakes
(amongst others). Upon hearing such calls, vervets use different escape responses that
are appropriate for evading that type of predator. Vervet monkeys look upwards to the
sky in response to eagle alarms, whereas they run into trees in response to leopard
alarms and stand up tall looking into the grass upon hearing snake alarms.108 Using
playback experiments, Cheney and Seyfarth showed that the vervets’ escape and
vigilance behaviours held constant in response to audio recordings that were played to
the vervets, even when there was no actual predator present and thus no visual or
auditory stimulus from any predators. Their research showed that vervet alarm calls
have semantic content in that they transmit information from the caller to the receiver
(e.g., information about the kind of risk, or behavioural response which is appropriate for
the situation). Cheney and Seyfarth write, “Although monkeys may not be aware of the
relation between sign and referent, they nevertheless compare calls on the basis of their
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referents and not just on the basis of their acoustic properties.”109 Thus, vervet monkeys
communicate in functionally referential ways.
Cheney and Seyfarth also showed that the vervets produce calls voluntarily.
Lone vervets who encounter a predator do not call.110 Additionally, vervets appear to
modulate their calls in ways that are sensitive to the existence and composition of their
audience. Female vervets emit more alarm calls when accompanied by their own
progeny than when they are with juveniles unrelated to them.111 Therefore, vervet alarm
calls cannot be automated reflexive responses to predators, but rather are produced
voluntarily. Based on this level of intentionality, it is possible that calling vervets wish to
affect the behaviour of other vervets, without necessarily wanting to influence the mental
states of others.
Thus, nonhuman animals such as black-capped chickadees and vervet monkeys
use referentially specific signals that appear to transmit information between callers and
receivers. In short, they engage in meaningful communication. Unfortunately for Grice’s
theory, it would be implausible to attribute Gricean reflexive communicative intentions to
black-capped chickadees and vervet monkeys, since there is no evidence that they can
attribute third-order mental states to others. While there is empirical evidence showing
that primates are often sensitive to the perceptual and mental states of others and thus
have some theory of mind, there is no evidence that they have the third-order theory of
mind required for Gricean communicative intentions. Thus, Grice’s account of nonnatural
meaning cannot explain such cases of apparently meaningful communication in
nonhuman animals. In what follows, I consider an account of meaning that requires no
ascription of communicative intentions to the speaker or caller.
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3.3 Semantic meaning can emerge regardless of intention
Mitchell Green is also dissatisfied with intention-based semantic theories like
Grice’s theory, for they do not make room for more simpler forms of communication,
e.g., signals used by nonhuman animals. Green protests that Grice’s “dominant
framework affords little room for making sense of more primitive forms of meaning that
we might discover among nonhuman animals, or for that matter within our own
species.”112 Green outlines two main problems with such intention-based semantics.
First, intention-based semantic theories give explanatory priority to intentions rather than
word meaning.113 Second, these theories place overly high cognitive demands on
speakers we intuitively think can speak meaningfully, including children. He also notes
that intention-based semantic theories cannot explain how meaningful communication
occurs in nonhuman animals. Thus, Green argues for intention-free semantics,
proposing that we can make sense of meaning without appeal to the communicator’s
underlying mentality.
Green provides an account of semantics that allows for meaningful signals
without grounding meaning in the communicator’s intentions. He proposes a kind of
meaning that is neither natural meaning nor speaker meaning, but rather something in
between: organic meaning. On Green’s account of organic meaning, animal calls and
other signals (including traits) may have semantic properties that are directed at the
world, even if callers do not intend to refer to the world in this way. Thus, such animal
signals are meaningful, not because of the caller’s intentions, but because the signals
themselves function as carriers of informational content. Animal signals can transmit
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information about the world even when callers do not intend to transmit such information.
In other words, animal calls can have semantic meaning, whether or not the callers
intend to refer or are aware of how the calls refer to the external world. On Green’s view,
the signal’s organic meaning would “only be established after painstaking empirical
investigation.”114 Green thus shows how semantic meaning can emerge without relying
on communicative intentions or other sophisticated mental processes to explain it. His
theory of organic meaning accounts for the meaningful calls that vervets, chickadees
and other organisms use, in a way that does not appeal to the animal’s intentions.
3.4 Organic meaning accounts for animal calls
Green points out that animal calls such as vervet alarms can have semantic
properties based on world-directedness, even if vervets don’t intend to refer. Even if
vocalizing the alarm call were an involuntary response to the predator, and not made
intentionally, the call would carry meaning that is not a natural meaning. The alarms are
meaningful in that they signal that a certain kind of predator is present. But, these alarm
calls do not have natural meaning, for they do not fulfill the factive condition of natural
meaning. In other words, one could indeed say “That vervet’s short double-syllable
cough means an eagle is near, but no eagle is near.” Indeed, infant vervet monkeys
often make mistakes when giving alarm calls, for example, by giving an eagle alarm call
in response to a falling leaf. 115 As they grow up, vervets eventually learn to produce the
appropriate calls in response to the appropriate stimuli.
Referentially specific alarm calls also have stable meaning. The vervet’s leopard
alarm consistently means that a leopard is near, while the eagle alarm consistently
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signals the presence of an eagle. The leopard alarm does not change meaning to signal
the presence of an eagle or a snake. Such alarm calls refer to the type of predator, and
they do so consistently. The chickadee’s “seet” call consistently means a fast-moving
predator such as a flying raptor is near, and does not change meaning to signal a
stationary predator. Moreover, these alarm calls are functional, as animals who hear and
understand the alarm respond with evasive behaviour that is appropriate for that type of
predator.
It is not clear the extent to which these animals are intentional in vocalizing their
alarm calls. Empirical research shows that vervet call production is voluntary rather than
automatic,116 but we do not know whether vervets are intentionally transmitting
information about predators to others. Green argues, however, that the fact that humans
use language voluntarily, with intentions regarding others’ mental states, does not
establish that these features are essential to semanticity. Thus, these animals’ alarm
calls are functional, referential symbols with meaning that is not natural meaning.
3.5 How conventional meaning can emerge
Brian Skyrms denies Grice’s distinction between natural and non-natural
meaning. Skyrms writes, “Natural meaning depends on associations arising from natural
processes. I say that all meaning is natural meaning.”117 On Skyrms’s interpretation,
Grice’s distinction is that between conventional (non-natural) and non-conventional
(natural) meaning. However, Skyrms denies Grice’s distinction on the basis that
conventional meaning is in fact a kind of natural meaning. Skyrms gives an account of
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how the conventional meaning of word-like symbols might arise spontaneously, with
reference to David Lewis’s theory of conventional meaning.
On Lewis’s account of convention, we can understand the emergence of
conventional meaning in terms of game theory.118 Consider a signalling game with two
cooperative players: a sender and a receiver. The sender wishes to send information to
the receiver, but there are no pre-existing conventions of meaning. Suppose there are
three possible states of affairs in the world that the sender would want to transmit
information about (e.g., the presence of food, toys, and predators) and three kinds of
messages that can be used as signals (e.g., red, blue, green).
The sender’s strategy specifies what signal will be sent for each situation that
arises. Supposing that the sender has a strategy that differentiates between each of the
three states, she could signal, for example, red for food, blue for toys, and green for
predators. Suppose also that the receiver has three possible actions to take in response
to the messages he receives (e.g., eat, play, hide). If the receiver’s strategy
differentiates between each of the three possible messages, then he might eat on
receiving a red signal, play on blue, and hide on green, for example.
Note that the best outcome for both players would be to coordinate such that the
receiver’s behavioural response is appropriate to the state. For example, the best
outcome would be for the receiver to eat when there’s food, play when there are toys,
and hide when there are predators. When the sender and receiver can coordinate such
that the receiver acts optimally for the state of affairs, then there is an equilibrium. As
Brian Skyrms explains, “An equilibrium is a pair of sender’s strategy and receiver’s
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strategy with the property that neither player can do better by unilateral deviation from
the equilibrium.”119 In an equilibrium that distinguishes between the (three) different
possible states, meaning emerges. In our example, red means that there is food, blue
means that there are toys, while green means that there are predators present. Note that
it doesn’t matter in itself whether a red, blue, or green signal is used to indicate the
presence of food; what’s important is that the receiver responds appropriately to the
state, regardless of which signal is used. In this way, the meaning of the signal is
arbitrary. Red itself doesn’t intrinsically indicate the presence of food, but rather it’s the
fact that the sender signals red when there’s food, along with the fact that the receiver
comes to eat when receiving a red signal that gives red its conventional meaning (that
there is food present).
One might ask how individuals without pre-existing conventions can get to such a
well-coordinated equilibrium. Maintaining conventions is beneficial for all involved
because an individual who unilaterally deviates from the convention makes everyone
worse off. According to Lewis, if everyone has common knowledge of the game and its
strategies, then everyone knows not to deviate or defect. However, we do not have an
adequate account of how everyone gets this common knowledge.
Building on Lewis’s account of convention, Brian Skyrms suggests that
individuals need no prior knowledge or agreement when it is evolutionarily advantageous
for them to converge on a meaningful signaling system.120 Thus, Skyrms sidesteps the
need for common knowledge. On this picture, animals are already sensitive to natural
signs. If situations repeatedly occur in which it’d be adaptive for animals to establish a
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conventional signal, then these signals will emerge. Given that natural selection
operates on all animals, the animals that behave adaptively in response to the signal will
survive better than those who do not. In the example we’ve been using, individuals who
come to eat when receiving red signals will do better than those who do not, assuming
food is scarce. Likewise, when there is significant risk of predation, individuals who hide
when receiving green signals will do better than those who do not. Thus, conventional
meaning emerges via natural selection when there are adaptive advantages to
coordinating such signals. With referentially specific alarm calls, there are clearly
adaptive advantages for animals to use and understand the calls to respond more
optimally.
Green imagines that a system of vervet communication could emerge in the
future, including different kinds of noun and predicate terms that could be combined to
allow future vervets to describe their environment more precisely. Such a system of
communication would have conventional meaning, in that it would be arbitrary, regular,
and normative, thereby illustrating how intention-free semantics is viable even in more
sophisticated forms of communication.121
3.6 Organic meaning is not apt for intentionally referring speakers
While Green’s intention-free account of organic meaning aptly explains a variety
of animal signals, his account of organic meaning fails to capture more sophisticated
communicative behaviours by speakers who do refer intentionally, as in the utterances
of human children and Alex the parrot. Green follows ethologists in referring to alarm
calls as functionally referential, which describes referentially specific calls without any
connotation that the caller has an intention to refer. According to Green, “On this usage,

121

Green, “How Much Mentality Is Needed for Meaning,” 321.

76

terms that are functionally referential behave as if they are referring terms, even if not
produced by creatures intending to refer to an object or intending to draw another
organism’s attention to that object.”122 He notes that intentions to refer are typical of
human speakers, “Alarm calling and like signaling are not normally under the voluntary
control of the animals producing the calls, whereas humans can typically choose
whether to refer to an object verbally, in some other way, or not at all.”123
When children and Alex the parrot speak, their speech is not merely functionally
referential; on the contrary, they appear to intend to refer to the objects, events, and
other things of which they speak. They produce utterances intentionally, in conversation
with others. They understand questions that are asked of them, and they can then
respond to queries appropriately. For example, when asked to describe an object’s
colour, they (i.e., Alex and children) can give the correct response, thus demonstrating
their intention to refer to the same object and its colour using conventional meaning.
While such utterances do have organic meaning, they also have meaning in a more
specific sense that is not captured by Green’s account. The communicative behaviour of
Alex and children seems much more sophisticated than the other cases of animal
communication I have discussed. In what follows, I consider a reinterpretation of Gricean
theory to evaluate its aptness for capturing this kind of meaningful communication.
Section 4: Assessing Gricean communicative intentions for the origination of
meaning
4.1 Reinterpreting Gricean theory
I have argued that we should reject Grice’s theory, given the implausibility that
speakers, such as Alex the parrot and children, who do mean when they speak, have
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third-order communicative intentions. In this section, I consider Dorit Bar-On’s
interpretation of Grice, which has lesser cognitive demands on communicators using
words and phrases that already have conventional meaning. By combining Grice’s
theory of meaning with Lewis’s theory of convention, Bar-On theorizes that nonnatural
meaning is originated by speakers with Gricean communicative intentions, then the
conventional meaning of expressions is established over repeated use as Lewis
describes.
Dorit Bar-On argues that Grice should be interpreted as a reconstruction of the
conditions under which linguistic meaning, a particular kind of nonnatural meaning, could
have originated.124 In her words, his theory “purports to explain how linguistic meaning
could come about.”125 According to Bar-On’s “genetic rational reconstruction”
interpretation of Grice’s account, full Gricean communicative intentions are needed only
in original cases of linguistic meaning, e.g., the first time an expression is uttered or is
used for a novel purpose.126 In such original cases of meaning, the presence of Gricean
reflexive communicative intentions allows nonnatural meaning to emerge. When using a
new expression, the originating speaker has full Gricean intentions to give the
expression nonnatural meaning; she intends to communicate something in particular to
her audience, and she intends that the audience understand it via recognition of such
intention. Bar-On explains:
On the ‘genetic’ construal, Grice’s account of speaker meaning is only intended
to highlight the role that rational agents’ intentions play in the introduction of
nonnatural meaning into the natural scene. Nonnatural meaning can emerge
when prelinguistic rational agents capable of transmitting information and altering
other agents’ beliefs begin to notice their ability to do so, and begin to care about
Bar-On, “Meaning Reconstructed,” 97.
Bar-On, 84.
126 Bar-On, 84.
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the ways in which the information is transmitted to their audience – when they
develop reflexive communicative intentions.127
According to Bar-On’s reconstruction, there is no need for Gricean intentions to be an
“active mechanism” in ordinary speech.128
In originating cases, speaker meaning is grounded in the speaker’s full Gricean
communicative intentions. To originate new expressions and imbue them with meaning,
the speaker S needs the receiver R to recognize S’s intention to influence R’s beliefs via
S’s utterance. Upon repeated use of the expression, its meaning becomes public or
conventional. Speakers and receivers no longer need Gricean intentions when the
expression’s meaning remains the same and if they know what that meaning is. With
conventional meaning established, audiences can understand utterances without
reference to the speaker’s communicative intentions. Hearers need not recognize the
speaker’s communicative intentions to interpret speech. Instead, they simply need to
understand the conventional meaning. Similarly, speakers do not need Gricean reflexive
communicative intentions to speak with nonnatural meaning, if it is pre-established and
perpetuated by convention. Speakers need to have reflexive communicative intentions
only when they originate meaning, according to Bar-On’s genetic interpretation of
Gricean theory.
4.2 Advantages of Bar-On’s genetic account
Consequently, on the genetic interpretation of Grice, the problem of
psychological implausibility appears to dissipate. Bar-On writes, “There is no need to
ascribe to speakers participating in ordinary speech transactions, or to children
becoming participants in linguistic communication, thoughts, intentions, beliefs,
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expectations, etc. of the kind invoked in the Lewisian/Gricean account of convention.”129
Since instances of ordinary speech get their meaning from convention without requiring
direct Gricean intentions, we no longer need to worry about the psychological plausibility
of Gricean intentions in cases of conventional speech. Thus, an advantage of Bar-On’s
Gricean account is that we can have meaningful utterances without attributing
sophisticated third-order communicative intentions to speakers. Speakers can make
meaningful utterances using pre-existing expressions without these reflexive intentions.
On this account, it seems we could attribute nonnatural meaning to speakers,
such as children and Alex the parrot, of whom we might hesitate to attribute such
sophisticated intentions and theory of mind. Indeed, this view seems intuitively plausible.
Consider children, as well as adults with cognitive disabilities. They can be taught the
meanings of pre-existing words and use them thereafter to speak meaningfully with
others, without the need for Gricean communicative intentions.
Likewise, Alex the parrot was trained to use pre-existing English words, with
meanings already attached. Pepperberg taught him, for example, that the word “wood”
refers to wood. When Alex learned words, he learned their conventional meanings. The
meaning of his utterances relied on the conventional meaning pre-established by a
community of English speakers past and present. Since Alex was taught words that
already had meaning, there was no need for him to originate meaning when he uttered
those words. Thus, Alex’s utterances could have nonnatural meaning, consistent with
Bar-On’s genetic interpretation of Grice, without needing to attribute any reflexive
communicative intentions to him. Alex could communicate meaningfully, using words
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with conventional meaning that he’d been taught, without needing Gricean
communicative intentions.
4.3 Alex the parrot originates meaning
Although Bar-On’s genetic interpretation of the Gricean account offers a more
plausible account of everyday speech, it still requires full Gricean communicative
intentions to originate meaning when coining a new expression. In what follows, I
discuss a case in which Alex the parrot coins a new expression. In this example, he not
only vocalizes a new sound, but also he introduces meaning to that sound-symbol.
In 1985, after seven years in the Pepperberg lab, Alex originated the expression
“banerry.” Pepperberg recounts how this occurred while attempting to teach Alex the
word “apple”:
By the end of the season for fresh apples, Alex had learned to produce
a puny little “puh” sound, a pathetic fragment of “apple.” Nothing more.
And he entirely refused to eat apple. We decided to try again the next
spring, when fresh apples would arrive from the Southern Hemisphere.
Months later Alex did condescend unenthusiastically to eat some apple
when offered, but still only produced “puh.”
Then suddenly, in the second week of training in mid-March
1985, he looked at the apple quite intently, looked at me, and said
“Banerry… I want banerry.” He snatched a bite of the apple and ate it
happily. He looked as if he had suddenly achieved something he had
been searching for.
I had no idea what he was talking about. So I said, “No, Alex,
apple.”
“Banerry,” Alex replied, quickly but quite patiently.
“Apple,” I said again.
“Banerry,” Alex said again.
OK, buddy, I thought. I’ll make it a bit easier for you. “Ap-ple,” I
said, emphasizing the second syllable.
81

Alex paused a second or two, looked at me more intently, and
said, “Ban-erry,” exactly mimicking my cadence.
We went through this double act several times: “Ap-ple.” “Banerry.” “Ap-ple.” “Ban-erry.” …At the end of that session he said, very
slowly and deliberately, “Ban-err-eeee,” just as I might do with him
when I was trying to [teach] him a new label….
I still had no idea what Alex was talking about, even though he
obviously thought he did. Try as we might, he wouldn’t budge from
“banerry.” No matter how hard we worked to get him to say “apple,” he
stuck with his label.130
On my analysis, Alex did mean something by uttering “banerry” for the following
reasons: 1) he voluntarily produced the utterances in a controlled manner, 2) he
intended to communicate referentially with his utterances, and 3) his utterance of
“banerry” has meaning that is not natural meaning.
First, Alex’s vocalizations of “banerry” are best explained as voluntary. If they
were involuntary vocalizations, they could be genetically inherited vocal behaviours, or
otherwise automatic, induced or forced. It is not plausible that Alex was genetically hardwired to vocalize “banerry,” since grey parrots generally do not make this sound, unless
they have been trained to do so, as in the Pepperberg lab. If grey parrots had genes that
predisposed them to vocalize “banerry,” people would have observed many “banerry”
calls from untrained grey parrots, yet they have not. For example, although the
Cruickshank study reveals great vocal diversity from the wild grey parrot subjects,
Cruickshank does not report that the parrots vocalized “banerry.”131 Pepperberg notes
that Alex had never been observed to vocalize “banerry” before his training with apples
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began.132 Thus, it is unlikely that “banerry” is a call that grey parrots, including Alex, are
genetically predisposed to make.
Another possibility to consider is that Alex was induced or forced to vocalize
“banerry” through conditioning or association. However, he could not have vocalized it
from prior association, since “banerry” was not a sound that Pepperberg or others in the
lab had said before. If he had never heard “banerry” before, then Alex could not have
been induced to vocalize this particular sound “banerry.” Though it is possible that he
could have been conditioned to vocalize some sounds in the presence of Pepperberg,
he could not have been conditioned to vocalize “banerry,” since it was a novel sound
that had not been vocalized by others in the lab. As Pepperberg recounts the event, Alex
vocalized the sound without being prompted or cued. In summary, it would be
implausible to claim that Alex vocalized “banerry” involuntarily or automatically, when
“banerry” was neither a sound that had been introduced to him by others, nor a vocal
behaviour given to him by his genes. Thus, “banerry” was likely a sound that originated
from Alex himself.
Given that “banerry” originated from Alex, another possibility is that the
vocalization was voluntary but uncontrolled, in the sense that he was producing random
nonsense sounds, as in gibberish. However, I argue that this explanation is implausible,
given the series of events that occurred. Alex produced a well-formed vocalization of
“banerry” in his initial utterance, then repeated it at least six times more during that
exchange. Since he consistently repeated the same syllables, it is unlikely that his
vocalizations were random or accidental. Given the control with which he produced
further vocalizations of “banerry,” the gibberish hypothesis is unlikely. Alex repeated
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“banerry” in slightly different ways; he vocalized it more slowly, deliberately, and with
greater emphasis on the individual syllables, thus displaying a great degree of control
over the vocalization. It is also unlikely that Alex was babbling, not only because he
displayed vocal control in his repetitions, but also because he typically did not babble in
the presence of others. He usually babbled and tried to vocalize new sounds in
private.133 The syllables used in “banerry” were not new to Alex; rather they were
syllables from other words he had already learned to produce. The way that Alex
vocalized “banerry” in a controlled way, repeatedly and with varying emphasis, suggests
that it was a stable vocalization rather than a one-off random jumbling of sounds. Thus, I
have argued that Alex’s vocalizations of “banerry” were under his voluntary control; the
vocalizations were not random gibberish he was producing, nor were they induced by
others or his genes. Most plausibly, Alex intended to vocalize “banerry.”
Secondly, the most plausible motive to attribute to Alex in saying “banerry” is that
he intended to communicate referentially. Since I already argued that it is implausible to
think he was vocalizing nonsensical sounds, I will now consider alternative explanations
involving intentions to communicate non-referentially. One possibility is that he intended
to vocalize “banerry” to show that he could produce this new combination of sounds,
without intention to refer. Another possibility is that he uttered “banerry” to see how
Pepperberg might react. Perhaps he wanted to see how Pepperberg might interpret his
vocalization; perhaps he was curious to see if his vocalization would prompt her to show
him a novel object. Indeed, Pepperberg and her team used referential mapping
techniques to expand Alex’s repertoire of labels; when Alex produced new vocalizations
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that made sense, they would reward him by presenting the appropriate object to him. For
example, when Alex spontaneously combined two words he knew into the novel
utterance of “rock corn,” they gave him a dried corn kernel.134 Although Pepperberg
would have responded to many of Alex’s novel vocalizations in this way, such
explanation does not fit the “banerry” case. Alex did not utter “banerry,” then wait to see
what object he might receive. On the contrary, Alex said “Banerry… I want banerry,”
then took a bite of the fruit. His own action of banerry-eating connected the soundsymbol “banerry” with the banerry fruit.135 He did not wait for Pepperberg to get him a
different object. He did not repeat his request “I want banerry” when she did not give him
anything. None of his behaviour indicated that he expected her to fetch him any objects.
Indeed, he did not need Pepperberg to get anything for him since he had already eaten
a bite of the item he desired.
Alex’s behaviour indicates that he intended to refer to the fruit with his
utterances. He demonstrated the referent of “banerry” and the object of his desire by
announcing “Banerry… I want banerry,” then eating the banerry. He used “banerry” as a
noun within a known request phrase he commonly used (“I want X”), suggesting that he
intended “banerry” to refer to an object, and more specifically, an object that he desired.
Alex linked his vocalization of “banerry” to the desired object, by subsequently eating a
piece of the banerry fruit. Alex connected the label “banerry” with the physical object, the
banerry fruit, in different ways: first, when he gazed at the fruit before saying “banerry,”
and again, when he ate some banerry after saying “I want banerry.”
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Moreover, in looking first at the fruit and then at Pepperberg, his gaze indicated
the object of his utterance, then signaled to Pepperberg that the object of his gaze was
relevant to her. Alex could have used gaze alternation to establish joint attention with
Pepperberg; if she followed his gaze, she would have seen that his gaze was directed at
the banerry. Gaze alternation has been recognized as a communicative behaviour in
different animals, including dogs, humans and other primates.136 Humans often give
each other meaningful looks in this way, by alternating their gazes between the object of
attention and the person with whom they wish to communicate.
According to Pepperberg’s account, Alex reiterated “banerry” when Pepperberg
responded with “apple,” for a total of at least eight utterances of “banerry.” When
Pepperberg successively fails to use it as a label, Alex begins, with the fifth iteration of
“banerry,” to repeat it more slowly and with greater emphasis on the individual syllables.
In this way, he seems to imitate the vocal behaviour Pepperberg often used when
teaching new labels, by lengthening the articulation of each syllable for emphasis.
Whether Alex vocalized in this way because he intended to aid her learning of “banerry”
or simply because he was mimicking a cadence he had heard in association with new
labels is difficult to determine at this point. At any rate, this cadence pattern was
associated with new labels. Thus, Alex’s use of this cadence pattern suggests his
awareness that “banerry” was a new label.
I have argued that with each behaviour, it is most plausible to attribute to Alex the
intention to refer. Considered as a sequence of actions, the argument is even stronger.
He alternated his gaze, which established joint attention with Pepperberg on the fruit.
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Then, he referred to the fruit as “banerry.” Next, he announced that he wanted banerry,
then ate the fruit. After that, he repeated “banerry” at least six times in response to
Pepperberg’s non-compliant utterances of “apple,” with varying cadences associated
with the teaching and learning of new labels. While it is theoretically possible that any
single action of his could have been accidental, random or otherwise non-intentionallyreferential, such explanation becomes less and less plausible when we consider these
actions together, namely, that he directed Pepperberg’s attention to the same object, the
banerry, a total of ten times in succession, via his gaze, utterances and behaviour.
Additionally, we should note that Alex’s new sound-symbol of “banerry” was not
composed of random phonemes he had already learned to vocalize. Rather, “banerry” is
composed of syllables from other labels for fruit in his repertoire: “banana” and “cherry.”
His choice of sounds is significant, for it suggests that Alex may have been deliberate in
choosing syllables from labels in the same category of objects (e.g., foods, fruits, edible
fruits). Pepperberg writes of Alex’s “banerry” utterance, “The label made some semantic
sense: Apples taste somewhat like bananas and look like very large cherries.”137
Thirdly, the meaning that Alex’s “banerry” utterance has is not natural meaning.
“Banerry” is not a natural sign with natural meaning, in the way that smoke is a natural
sign of fire, such that smoke means fire. There is no natural connection between the
vehicle of expression “banerry” and the signified, i.e., the sweet, edible fruit that grows
on Malus pumila trees, so this cannot be a case of natural meaning. There is no relation
of resemblance between the label and the fruit, nor any other natural connection. It is not
factive, for it makes sense to say, “Alex means that is banerry, but that is not.”
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Alex’s utterances function to give “banerry” a shared, stable meaning. First, Alex
used “banerry” consistently to refer to the fruit. He did not use “banerry” to refer to
anything else. Moreover, through his utterances, Alex shared the stable meaning of
“banerry” with another user in his linguistic community, Pepperberg. There is normativity
to “banerry.” When Pepperberg said “apple” in response to Alex’s “banerry,” his reassertions of “banerry” function as corrections of her mislabeling. Thus, Alex’s
utterances appear to express the idea that “banerry” is the appropriate label for the fruit,
and that “apple” is not an appropriate label for the fruit. According to this norm, Alex
consistently and correctly used the label “banerry” to refer to the edible fruit.
Furthermore, it is important to consider the context in which Alex first uttered
“banerry” to Pepperberg in 1985. At the time he uttered “banerry,” Alex had been trained
for seven years in using vocalized speech-sounds to communicate referentially with
humans. He was not an individual inexperienced with referential communication. He had
already learned that words and labels are not random sounds, but rather ways to
communicate with others about objects and desires, for example. Pepperberg’s training
program for Alex had consistently and explicitly linked the use of these speech-sounds
to referentiality. As I argue in Chapter 2, demonstrating the usefulness of reference is a
critical dimension to the acquisition of referential communication. Alex had indeed
acquired referential communication. He consistently used English words to refer and had
demonstrated his ability to communicate referentially to at least 80% accuracy in formal
testing.138 Thus, Alex was familiar with the vocal behaviours surrounding conventional
(or shared, stable, and referential) meaning between communicators; he was familiar
with the behavioural pattern in which all communicators in the lab used the same label to
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refer to a given object. Ultimately, the best explanation of Alex’s “banerry” utterances is
that he was continuing his practice of intentionally using these speech-sounds to refer.
He used “banerry” to refer to the fruit, and he seemed to desire Pepperberg’s
compliance in using the same label.
4.4 A challenge for Bar-On’s Gricean theory
According to Bar-On’s genetic Gricean account, for Alex to have originated
meaning in the “banerry” case would require full Gricean reflexive communicative
intentions. For him to mean something nonnaturally when he produced the “banerry”
utterances, Alex would need to fulfill the three Gricean conditions for speaker meaning:
1. Alex must intend to induce by his utterances a belief in Pepperberg
2. Alex must also intend that Pepperberg recognizes (1)
3. Alex must intend that Pepperberg’s recognition of (1) functions as a reason
for Pepperberg to have that belief
However, this still seems too demanding. It’s not clear that such complicated
communicative intentions are needed for Alex to coin a new label. In considering this
example, it becomes clear that Grice’s conditions are not required for Alex’s “banerry”
utterances to have meaning.
First, given that Alex meant something by his “banerry” utterances, I deny that it
was necessary for him to intend to induce a belief or any mental state in Pepperberg.
While it is possible that Alex intended for Pepperberg to understand that the label
“banerry” referred to the fruit, it is also possible that Alex simply intended that she
behave in a certain way, e.g., that she call the fruit “banerry” (rather than “apple”) and
respond cooperatively to his requests for “banerry.” Given what we know about the
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situation, it is plausible to reconstruct Alex’s intentions as being directed at her behaviour
alone, or at her behaviour and her mental states. Recall that Alex had been exposed to
the term “apple” for months as Pepperberg attempted to teach it to him. Recall also that
he seemed to have difficulty pronouncing the word “apple” and had only produced a
“puh” sound. Given Alex’s well-demonstrated cognitive capacity for learning referential
labels, it is plausible that he may have already understood that Pepperberg’s use of
“apple” referred to the fruit. According to Pepperberg, it typically took 1-2 months for Alex
to learn to produce new sounds.139 So, there is reason to think that pronouncing “apple”
presented a particular difficulty for him. In this scenario, Alex could have understood that
an unpronounceable label referred to the fruit and perhaps wished to change the label to
dissolve the difficulty. It would be reasonable for him to prefer a pronounceable label to
an unpronounceable one. For Alex, “banerry” was a pronounceable label. When Alex
first uttered “Banerry… I want banerry,” he was in full vocal control of the new label. Alex
could readily and clearly pronounce it. Moreover, he likely knew he had no problem
pronouncing “banerry,” since its syllables came from labels he already used (“banana”
and “cherry.”) Since he intended “banerry” to refer to the fruit and he was already familiar
with the practice of referential communication, it is plausible that Alex wished to
communicate the reference of “banerry” to Pepperberg. We could interpret their
exchange as Alex’s attempts to establish a different shared term for the fruit, as he
corrects each instance in which Pepperberg inappropriately uses the defunct label
“apple” rather than the new and improved label “banerry.” His utterances seem to
express his intention for her to acquire the label “banerry,” such that they could both use
the term and understand each other when using it. Thus, Alex’s utterances functioned to
ritualize the new word, thus establishing a shared, stable meaning for “banerry.”
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The second condition of Bar-On’s Gricean account requires that Alex must intend
that Pepperberg recognize his intention to induce certain beliefs or mental states in her.
However, it’s also possible that Alex merely intended that she outwardly behave in
accordance with his desires (e.g., by fetching him the appropriate fruit when he asked for
“banerry”) or accept the label. Although her recognizing his intention would be consistent
with his intentions in this scenario, Alex need not intend for Pepperberg to recognize that
he wants her to call the fruit “banerry.” He could simply intend for Pepperberg to
understand that when he says he wants “banerry,” he means that particular fruit. Thus, if
Alex was interested in labelling the fruit because he desired it, then Alex could have
been satisfied as long as Pepperberg’s behaviour was responsive to his desires; it is
unnecessary for him to consider her recognition of his intentions when her behaviour is
compliant. Indeed, Pepperberg observed that, much like children, Alex’s retention of a
label was correlated with his interest in the item it referred to.140 Thus, it seems plausible
that Alex meant to refer with his utterances of “banerry,” without intending for
Pepperberg to recognize anything in particular. Although Pepperberg eventually
recognized that Alex intended for her to call the fruit “banerry,” Alex didn’t need to intend
such recognition to originate the meaning of “banerry.”
The third condition requires that Alex intends to induce a belief in Pepperberg
(e.g., that the fruit should be called "banerry”) via her recognition that he intended to
make her believe that. For reasons similar to those I already discussed, I deny that this
condition is needed for Alex to have originated meaning with “banerry.” Again, a
sufficient explanation for his utterances and behaviour is that Alex had intentions
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directed at Pepperberg’s outward behaviour, not that he had intentions directed at her
recognition of his intention.
Though Alex did not need Gricean communicative intentions to originate
meaning, the “banerry” case suggests sophisticated cognitive behaviour on his part,
other than his intention to influence her use of the label. He took the initiative to coin the
new label, showing creativity in the process. He chose to compose the new label out of
syllables from labels of other edible fruits in his repertoire, thus showing sensitivity to
category concepts similar to those used by humans. It is plausible that he recognized the
difficulty of having an unpronounceable label refer to a desirable edible fruit and acted to
replace it with a pronounceable label, thus solving his problem. Alex seemed to evince
awareness that “banerry” was a new label. When Pepperberg failed to utter the new
label, he recognized this failure. He persisted in uttering “banerry” to counter each of her
utterances of the defunct label “apple.” He not only repeated “banerry,” but also he
uttered it in different ways (more slowly and with emphasis), suggesting an awareness
that the situation called for greater attention on the label and its pronunciation.
Earlier, I showed that Alex originated meaning when he coined the term
“banerry.” I have now argued that he did not need to satisfy Grice’s conditions for
speaker meaning even though he originated meaning. Rather, Alex likely intended to
elicit a particular behaviour from Pepperberg, namely that she call the fruit “banerry” and
respond appropriately to his requests for it. Although Alex had intentions to influence
Pepperberg with his utterances, we can plausibly reconstruct these intentions as being
directed at her behaviour, and not necessarily at her mental states. Thus, I deny that the
conditions given by Bar-On’s Gricean account are necessary for the origination of
meaning, as Alex plausibly originated meaning without them.
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Although Bar-On’s version of Gricean theory lessens cognitive demands on
those using pre-established meaning, it seems implausible to have such high cognitive
demands for the origination of meaning. Rather, it seems more plausible that higherorder communicative intentions would emerge after shared meaning is already in place,
perhaps when adept communicators begin playing with meanings and start to use words
in ironic, community-specific or other non-standard ways. Therefore, Gricean demands
of third-order communicative intentions are implausible also in cases of original
meaning.
4.5 Concluding remarks
In summary, I have shown how Grice’s account of meaning overintellectualizes in
its demand that speakers have third-order reflexive communicative intentions, which
seems to exclude children and Alex the parrot from meaning when they speak. While
Green’s intention-free account of organic meaning describes many cases of animal
signals found in nature, including functionally referential communication, it fails to
capture the meaningful communication of intentionally referring speakers like children
and Alex. So, we need an intention-based theory of meaning that is not as demanding
as Grice’s. Bar-On’s reconstruction of Gricean theory relegates the need for third-order
reflexive communicative intentions to cases of original meaning only. Bar-On’s
reconstructed Gricean theory thus accounts for everyday utterances of non-original
meaning, when communicators (including Alex, children, and other humans) can rely on
pre-existing conventional meaning without the need for Gricean intentions. However,
Bar-On’s account does not account well for a case in which Alex the parrot originates
meaning. It seems implausible to require Gricean communicative intentions for Alex to
coin a new word. While Gricean communicative intentions are useful for explaining
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sophisticated utterances, e.g., those involving irony, they are unnecessary and
implausible even in cases of original meaning. In this way, the utterances of Alex the
parrot pose a special challenge to existing philosophical accounts of meaning; this
talking parrot illuminates the need for a semantic theory that can account for speakers
who intentionally refer and originate meaning without positing third-order communicative
intentions.
At the same time, the case in which Alex coins “banerry” is an instance of a
nonhuman animal creatively originating meaning in a human-created language. This
case corroborates the importance of learning within an interactive social context, which
is one of the dimensions of the MUSE model for referential communication learning that I
presented in Chapter 2. In this case, Alex goes beyond using pre-established shared
meaning as a referential communicator by originating meaning in a new label for other
communicators to use thereafter. What prompted this level of active participation from a
parrot trained in the referential use of simple English words? He had not been trained
specifically to create new words or to originate meaning. However, he did participate in
learning new words, and observed the exchange between individuals during Model/Rival
training. Alex observed different people exchanging roles of initiating question-asker and
respondent. Through this process, he may have learned that any communicator can take
on either role in asking and answering questions. He may have generalized this notion of
interchangeability, and further understood that any communicator can take on any role in
communication, including the teaching of new words. By demonstrating to Alex that
communicative roles are fluidly exchanged while teaching him new words, researchers
may have inadvertently shown Alex that he could also take on the role of teaching new
words. If so, then this case also highlights the significance of learning in an interactive
context in which multiple users model the exchange of communicative roles. Modelling
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such interchange may encourage learners to take on different communicative roles as
well.
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CHAPTER 4: HOW CAN WE JUSTIFY INTERSPECIFIC INFERENCES ABOUT
COGNITION?
Section 1: Background
In 1977, scientist Irene Pepperberg began training Alex, a grey parrot, in the
referential use of English words. Over the next 30 years, Alex successfully demonstrated
his ability to communicate verbally with researchers. One day, Alex gazed into a mirror.
Seeing an image of a grey parrot but not knowing the word for its colour, Alex asked,
“What colour?” After being told that it was “grey,” Alex learned the word and used it to
refer to the colour grey.141 In addition to such anecdotes, Pepperberg collected reams of
research data documenting Alex's ability to communicate meaningfully using a simplystructured communication system based on English words. Such behaviour from an
animal species so phylogenetically distant to us -- the last common ancestor of humans
and grey parrots lived hundreds of millions of years ago -- raises the question: When a
parrot communicates in such a human-like way, using a human-based communication
system, on what basis might we infer that a similar mental capacity is responsible for
that similar behaviour?
1.1 Introduction
What is the significance of this question? First, it can provide a response to
skeptics who might reflexively explain Alex’s behaviour as a series of learned
associations between stimulus and label, rather than as cognitively complex processes
involving comprehension of meaning and intentions to communicate. A natural inference
to make would be that similar behaviours could license an inference to similar underlying
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capacities. However, rhetoric from those who are skeptical about claims of complex
cognition in nonhuman animals often takes the form of raising deflationary alternative
explanations that are possible with little argument that they are plausible.142 However,
the mere fact that a deflationary explanation is consistent with the behaviour is
insufficient to defeat the plausibility of claims of complex cognition in animals. When
investigating the underlying mechanisms that plausibly explain complex nonhuman
behaviour, we should attempt to make inferences to the best explanation. It is not the
case that any possible explanation is on par with our best explanations. Equally, we
cannot assume that our pet hypotheses are the best explanations. To infer that his
capacity is genuinely cognitive, e.g., that a parrot can really understand the words he’s
saying and hearing, we need to show exactly how and why such an inference could be
justified.
Secondly, the question of justifying similarity inferences between species is
significant because we need to determine the most plausible explanation for such
behaviours given the knowledge we have. The best explanation is informed by scientific
knowledge, and is consistent with what we already know. If a given claim X is our best
scientific explanation, then the existence of worse alternatives does little to affect X’s
status as the best explanation. So, we need a framework for determining what the best
explanation is, given that not all explanations are on a par when it comes to consistency
with accepted scientific knowledge.
Many researchers seem careful to minimize claims attributing sophisticated
mental capacities to nonhuman animals. Such claims could expose them to accusations
See Terrace’s remarks in Dinitia Smith, “A Thinking Bird or Just Another Birdbrain?,” The New
York Times, October 9, 1999, sec. Arts, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/09/arts/a-thinking-birdor-just-another-birdbrain.html.
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of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like characteristics
to nonhuman animals, but for many, it also carries the implication that the human-like
attribution is bad, unjustified, and unscientific. While many scientists seem careful to
avoid attributing cognitive complexity to nonhuman animals, there seems to be
disproportionately little effort made to avoid the converse problem of underattributing
cognitive capacity to nonhumans, due to an unjustified assumption of dissimilarity
between human and nonhuman cognitive complexity.143 Although the body of research
data on Alex renders implausible a deflationary explanation in this case, a framework for
assessing the plausibility of candidate similarity inferences is still needed in general.
More generally, we need a better understanding of what it means to draw
interspecific inferences about capacities for similar behaviours. Humans acquire
language when exposed to it during a critical development period as infants. What would
it mean to say that Alex or another nonhuman animal has a similar mental capacity
underlying similar communicative behaviour? Which similarities in observed behaviour
would suggest which similarities in the underlying capacities? Answers to these
questions can help us structure the way we reason about comparative cognition in
general. Thus, an investigation into these questions in the case of the English-speaking
parrot can also shed light on the justification of interspecific inferences in general.
In the parrot's case, we do not have the same plausible lines of reasoning that
may be used in primate cases of complex cognition and behaviour. In primates, we can
Kristin Andrews and Brian Huss, “Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null
Hypothesis,” Biology & Philosophy 29, no. 5 (2014): 711–729; Frans B. M. de Waal,
“Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency in Our Thinking about Humans and Other
Animals,” Philosophical Topics 27, no. 1 (1999): 255–80; John Andrew Fisher, “The Myth of
Anthropomorphism John Andrew Fisher,” Readings in Animal Cognition, 1996, 1; Sandra D.
Mitchell, “Anthropomorphism: Cross-Species Modeling,” 2001, http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/archive/00000374; Elliot Sober, “Comparative Psychology Meets Evolutionary
Biology,” Thinking with Animals, 2005, 85–99.
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reason that behaviours that are similarly complex to ours are likely due to similar
cognitive capacities, especially in species closely related to humans. In such cases,
what justifies the conjecture is the fact that we are closely related, along with a principle
of cladistic parsimony, namely that positing the same capacity or trait requires fewer
changes in the evolutionary history of these animals.144 For parrots, however, there is
little plausible justification from phylogenetic relatedness. Humans and parrots are
distantly related enough that it is not more parsimonious to posit that the underlying
capacity is the same. If we cannot argue from cladistic parsimony and phylogenetic
relatedness, can we justify an inference that the underlying mental capacity is similar? If
so, when and how could we justify such an inference for animals who are not very
closely related to humans, such as parrots?
1.2 Aims
My aim in this paper is to investigate on what grounds we might be able to draw
inferences about similarities in complex behaviours between different species. We know
that species X demonstrates a complex behaviour B due to certain cognitive capacities
M. We observe that species Y can also demonstrate behaviour like B. What should we
think about whether Y’s behaviour is due to cognitive capacities similar to M? Although
direct evidence would better justify claims about Y’s capacity, it is not always practical to
collect such evidence. Even when it is possible to study them, we might still want to
know what, if anything, could be inferred in the interim. (Given ample empirical evidence,
I assume that the nonhuman animals I discuss in this paper have mental capacities and
processes.)
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This project investigates how to justify inferences about underlying mental
capacities based on similarities in behaviour. The goal is to make justified inferences
that can help us better understand the mental capacities involved in the behaviour, while
avoiding unjustified inferences. To do this, we need to know how to understand
justification so that our justificatory bases are sound. Appropriate constraints should
exclude unreasonable inferences while including reasonable inferences. On one side,
we need to avoid overattributing cognitive similarities between species; we do not want
unjustified anthropomorphism. We also need to avoid overattributing similarity on the
basis of irrelevant similarities. For instance, we might not want to attribute cognitive
similarity on the mere basis that a creature is of the same colour as us. Just as we want
to avoid unjustified similarity inferences, we need to avoid under-attributing cognitive
similarity where it would be reasonable and helpful for understanding the mental
capacities underlying the behaviour. We need to be able to recognize when nonhuman
animals have cognitive capacities that function similarly to ours.
From an epistemic standpoint, under-attribution of cognitive similarity is just as
big a problem as anthropomorphic overattributing. From an ethical standpoint, it could be
an even larger problem if humans exclude nonhumans from moral consideration based
on erroneous judgements about their lack of cognitive sophistication. Thus, it is critical
that we have the appropriate constraints so that we include all and only reasonable
inferences. We need a principled way of distinguishing relevant from irrelevant
similarities that allows us to justify similarity-based inferences without including
unreasonable inferences or excluding reasonable inferences. A principled framework
would also function as a constraint against bias.
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In what follows, I examine different possible bases of justification for an inference
from similar behaviour to similar mental capacity. I begin by introducing Irene
Pepperberg’s research with Alex the grey parrot as a case study. Then, I consider three
different possible justificatory approaches, each at a different level of abstraction. The
three approaches map onto David Marr’s three levels of understanding an informationprocessing machine. According to Marr, the most abstract level is that of computational
theory, “the level of what the device does and why.”145 This level deals with what the
machine is computing and why it performs the processes it does. The second level deals
with how the computational theory is implemented in terms of the representation of input
and output, and the algorithm for the process that transforms input to output. The least
abstract level of analysis deals with how the representation and algorithm are physically
realized.146 I start at the lowest level of abstraction and argue that successively higher
levels of abstraction are needed for an adequate analysis of Alex’s referential
communication.
First, I discuss Elliott Sober’s approach, which bases justification on homologous
or common cause. Such a common cause approach provides strong epistemic warrant
for claims about the cognitive trait’s biological source. I show that Sober’s approach
cannot shed light on the nature of the underlying cognitive capacity, if we want to
understand more deeply about its function rather than its source.
Sandra Mitchell rejects traditional approaches to justification, as exemplified by
Sober, and offers an alternative approach to justification based on causal isomorphism.
Mitchell’s account provides strong justification for inferring causally equivalent underlying
David Marr, “Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and
Processing of Visual Information. MIT Press,” Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982, 22.
146 Marr, “Vision.”
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capacities if the causal structures of the two behaviours are isomorphic. Although
Mitchell’s approach accounts for a broad range of causal factors, I argue that this
approach is too tied to specific causal factors and that we should work at a higher level
of abstraction.
Having shown that both Sober and Mitchell's approaches cannot provide
justificatory frameworks for the kinds of interspecific inferences under consideration, I
suggest another approach inspired by Dedre Gentner’s structure-mapping theory of
analogical reasoning. On Gentner’s theory, we can map knowledge from one domain to
another based on similar systems of relations within each of the two domains.147 At this
level of abstraction, we can consider Alex’s communicative behaviour in terms of what
he is doing, why he is doing it, and also why he is able to do it. This is consistent with
what Marr calls the computational theory level of analysis, since we are trying to
understand what is being computed and why. I argue that a Gentner-inspired approach
focusing on similarities of relational structure avoids the limitations of Sober’s and
Mitchell’s approaches while providing a framework that emphasizes the similarities
relevant for justifying such inferences.
1.3 The case of Alex the talking parrot
As discussed in previous chapters, psychologist Irene Pepperberg trained Alex
the grey parrot to communicate referentially and functionally using English words.148 Alex
demonstrated in formal testing that he not only understood spoken words but also could
chose and vocalize words in contextually appropriate ways. With the words he used,

Dedre Gentner and Linsey Smith, “Analogical Reasoning,” Encyclopedia of Human Behavior
130 (2012): 130.
148 Pepperberg, The Alex Studies.
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Alex demonstrated appropriate usage not only with objects he was familiar with, but also
with novel objects, suggesting a generality to his understanding of what the words
meant. He knew how to use labels for objects and properties as well as more abstract
categories and concepts (“color”, “none”). Alex also used functional phrases to request
desired objects, including objects out of view, thus demonstrating that he used words
independent of external stimuli. In summary, he was able to use simple words to
communicate referentially in a simply-structured form, similar to how a young child might
communicate.
Alex learned to speak using different methods emphasizing social context. To
introduce new words to Alex, Pepperberg primarily used a Model/Rival technique
adapted from German biologist Dietmar Todt.149 In Pepperberg’s lab, two human trainers
would demonstrate the reference and functionality of target words, while providing social
interaction for the parrot. One human would act as the teacher, while the second human
acted as the bird’s peer. The second human functioned both as a “model” for the
appropriate communicative behaviour to be learned as well as a “rival” to Alex for
attention and rewards. While Alex observed, the teacher asked questions of the rival so
that the rival could exhibit both desired and undesired behaviour. Alex observed the
trainer’s reactions to these behaviours, thereby learning which behaviours were
rewarded or corrected. Then, the trainer posed questions of Alex, allowing Alex to
practice the desired behaviour. In Pepperberg’s lab, humans would switch roles so that
no human was exclusively associated with the role of the trainer nor that of the model or
rival.
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After Alex attempted to vocalize the new word in the presence of the referent
object, trainers would repeat the word in different sentences to clarify its pronunciation,
reminiscent of how human parents talk to young children. Pepperberg also used
referential mapping techniques to take advantage of novel vocalizations. If Alex
coincidentally vocalized an actual word, researchers tried to reward his utterance by
presenting the corresponding object.150 Alex also engaged in self-directed learning, as
exemplified in the case when Alex learned “grey” after enquiring about his reflection in
the mirror. When the Pepperberg lab acquired other grey parrots, Alex sometimes
served as the model and rival to help train other parrots using the two-trainer
Model/Rival method.
Although Alex could recombine some words, his syntax was limited. In the
course of training, Pepperberg used a more simplified structure for communicating with
Alex. For example, Pepperberg often omitted articles, the copula “is,” or other small
words with Alex. (It is not known whether he could have had more fully syntactic
linguistic communication if he had been further trained.) Though we cannot attribute full
language capacity to Alex, he demonstrated the ability to communicate meaningfully
using English words. He was capable of simply-structured referential communication.
Section 2: Homology and the common cause approach
A natural place to begin our discussion of similar-mental-capacity inferences is
justification on the basis of homology. A homology is a trait that is inherited from a
common ancestor. Elliott Sober offers an approach to justifying similar-mental-capacity
inferences based on a common cause. Since his approach is based on an appeal to
homology, it is constrained to justifying claims about the specific mechanism underlying
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the behaviour. In what follows, I explain his justificatory approach, then I discuss its
limitations.
2.1 Sober on self-to-other inferences
Sober begins by arguing that, assuming we accept non-deductive inferences in
science, we can make scientific inferences from introspection about our own mental
processes underlying a given behaviour to another individual’s mental processes
underlying similar behaviour. In a self-to-other inference, I might introspect that when I
go to get food, I desire to eat the food; when I see X go get food, I infer that X has the
same mental state as I do when exhibiting that behaviour, that is, X also desires to eat
the food. Structurally speaking, making an inference from the self to another individual is
no different from making the same inference from a single individual who isn’t oneself
(“the model”) to another individual (“the target”). The main non-structural difference
between these inferences is the lack of first-person access in non-self-to-other
inferences. Although first-person access may be significant in questions regarding the
phenomenological character of a given experience, it does not seem critical for settling
broad questions regarding cognitive capacity, e.g., whether an individual has the ability
to think. Some may view first-person access as being a more reliable method to get at
mental states. Even if this is the case, it merely affects how reliably we know the original
claim about the self; it does not affect the strength of the inference itself.
Given that there’s no logical problem with such model-to-target inferences, the
main issue is determining when they are warranted. Sober frames his discussion in
terms of the problem of inferring from knowledge of one’s own mind to another’s. This
inference begins with introspection into one’s own mental states attending a given
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behaviour to projecting a similar mental state upon observing another’s similar
behaviour. If we abstract from the idea of introspection, then we can consider individualto-other inferences more generally and investigate how these extrapolations can be
warranted. According to Sober’s analysis, the problem is not a problem with
extrapolating from a single subject to others; in other words, this is not an “n=1” problem.
Rather, the problem is about determining when a specific inductive inference makes
sense.
2.2 Justifying inferences based on common cause
When thinking about confirmation in science in general, we think that
observations can provide evidence for a hypothesis only in the context of its background
assumptions. Unless an observation deductively entails or precludes a given hypothesis,
we cannot decisively establish that the observation supports a hypothesis. Since any
empirical claims in science are made against a set of background assumptions,
hypotheses cannot be tested in isolation. The most we can argue is that the observation
confirms a hypothesis, in the context of further assumptions.151 The more plausible and
independently supported these other assumptions, the more plausible it is to claim that
the observation confirms the hypothesis. All of this applies when making scientific claims
about the cognitive capacities of animals. In the case of extrapolating to the mental
capacities of other species, the inference must be grounded by a plausible background
assumption.

Pierre Duhem, “Physical Theory and Experiment,” in Can Theories Be Refuted? (Springer,
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Sober argues that what justifies this extrapolation is a common cause structure
that induces the correlation between the two minds.152 Sober’s primary example of a
common cause structure is that of phylogenetic relatedness, though he also considers
non-genetic common causes, e.g., resemblances between students learning from the
same teacher. In the case of genealogical relatedness, the idea is that if the behaviour
arose from a common cause, then the mechanism for the behaviour may also be the
same; in this case, a common cause structure between the two individuals would justify
the inference that the mental capacities are similar. He explains that “If two species
exhibit a homologous behaviour, each of them must also possess an internal
mechanism (M or A) for producing the behaviour. It is more parsimonious to attribute the
same mechanism to both Self and Other than to attribute different mechanisms to
each.”153
Sober relies on a principle of cladistic parsimony to determine whether we can
justifiably posit a shared mechanism. Cladistic parsimony, based on the minimum
number of evolutionary changes required by a hypothesis, is used to make inferences
about how species are phylogenetically related. The principle of cladistic parsimony
prefers the hypothesis that require fewer evolutionary changes.154 For example, suppose
there are two competing hypotheses about the mental processes used by another
individual with similar behaviour to my own. One hypothesis postulates that the other
individual’s behaviour is caused by the same mental mechanism M as my own
behaviour. Another hypothesis postulates that the other’s behaviour is caused by an
alternative internal mechanism A. In comparing the rival hypotheses, we would look at
Elliot Sober, “Evolution and the Problem of Other Minds,” The Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 7
(2000): 383.
153 Sober, 377.
154 Sober, 372.
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the available evidence about the trait’s distribution and count the minimum number of
evolutionary changes required by each hypothesis. The hypothesis requiring fewer
changes is considered more evolutionarily parsimonious, and thus more plausible, all
else being equal. Depending on the empirical evidence regarding whether the
behaviours are derived from the same source, it may be more plausible to infer that the
other’s behaviour stems from the same mental characteristic M. For similar derived
behaviours, the principle of cladistic parsimony tells us that it’s better to posit the same
proximate mechanism as producing derived behaviours that are homologous. In some
cases, there may be two equally plausible hypotheses. If both hypotheses require the
same number of minimum changes, then the principle of cladistic parsimony prefers
neither. In this case, both hypotheses would be equally parsimonious and equally
plausible on Sober’s view.
In this way, Sober argues that if there are common cause structures affecting the
two organisms’ behaviours, then it’s more likely that that the homologous behaviour is
caused by the same proximate mechanism. Note that the principle of cladistic parsimony
applies only when the behaviour is homologous. Sober is careful to emphasize that
“parsimony favors anthropomorphism about mentalistic properties only when the
behaviors in question are thought to be homologous.”155 Thus, the similar-mentalcapacity claim justified by an appeal to homology is simply the claim of homology, that
is, that the underlying mental capacities of both the model’s and the target’s behaviour
are similar because they are versions of an ancestral trait. If the similar-seeming
behaviours arose independently, then of course parsimony doesn’t urge us to think that
the behaviours have the same cause. The argument from parsimony only applies when
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the behaviours originate from the same ancestral condition, such that it’s parsimonious
to think that the same proximate mechanisms are at work in both descendants. Thus,
Sober appeals to the idea that the underlying mental capacities could be homologies. If
the behaviours in the two individuals derive from a common cause, then a principle of
cladistic parsimony favours attributing the behaviours to the same proximate
mechanism.156
2.3 Applying the common cause approach to interspecific inferences
Now, let’s consider whether we could use a common cause justificatory approach
with the inference that Alex’s referentially communicative behaviour is due to a similar
mechanism as in humans. On Sober’s approach, the phylogenetic distance matters
greatly. If both the model and target individuals are humans, then there is much
justification for inferring that they have similar mental processes underlying their similar
behaviours. However, we quickly start losing justificatory force when the model and
target are of different species. Let us assume that the model individual is human. If the
target individual belonged to a species very closely related to humans (e.g., bonobos or
chimpanzees), we would have weak support for the inference from genealogical
relatedness. In the case where we are considering an inference about Alex the grey
parrot, we would get even less support from genealogical relatedness for the similarmental-capacity inference from humans to grey parrots. While the last common ancestor
of humans and bonobos existed roughly five million years ago, the last common
ancestor of humans and grey parrots is much more ancient, existing over 300 million
years ago. Humans and grey parrots belong to the same clade of amniotes,
characterized by having embryonic membranes surrounding the fetus, adapted to
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reproduce on land. Other basic structural features that humans and parrots share
include a vertebral column, gastrointestinal tract, central nervous system with spinal cord
and cephalisation, as well as four limbs, two eyes, and two ears. It would be difficult to
determine the psychological features humans and parrots have in common on the basis
of our distant genealogical relatedness. Therefore, in the case of comparing humans and
grey parrots, there would be negligible support for inferring similar cognitive capacity on
the basis of common cause. It is also unlikely that we could make a stronger case for
non-genetic common causes.
2.4 Limitations of the common cause approach
Sober’s approach can establish that the capacities underlying the similar
behaviours is the same. A common cause approach assumes homology, then justifies
inferences based on the assumption that the similar behaviours originate from the same
source. However, a common cause approach cannot help us if we are trying to
understand capacities that function similarly but may not have originated from the same
source. Thus, if we seek to understand the function of mechanisms underlying the
similar behaviour, then a common cause approach may not be helpful.
For example, consider that octopuses have two camera-type eyes, similar to
humans. Like humans, octopuses use their eyes to visually perceive light, which allows
them to perform visually guided tasks. Both human and octopus eyes have a cornea, an
iris with a pupil that allows light in, a round lens, a vitreous cavity, and photoreceptor
cells on a retina that translate light into nerve signals, which are transmitted by an optic
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nerve.157 However, octopus eyes may have evolved independently to perform many of
the same functions as human eyes. (A structural difference between octopus and human
eyes is that the nerve fibers in octopus eyes go behind the retina, rather than in front of
the retina as in humans, thus creating the blind spot in humans.) To use a common
cause approach like Sober’s, we would first need to posit that octopus and human eyes
are homologous, i.e., that they are the same trait inherited from the same ancestor,
before we could use our knowledge about one to reason about the other. Therefore, on
a common cause approach that assumes homology, we would not be able to draw
inferences between octopus and human eyes, since we cannot assume they are
inherited from a common ancestor, despite their many similarities in structure and
function. If we take seriously that octopus and human eyes are functionally similar, and
that such similarities can productively aid our understanding of them, then a common
cause approach is inadequate for our purposes. We need a way to make inferences
about how one eye works on the basis of understanding how the other eye works.
Thus far, I have argued that we need to depart from approaches that assume the
same cause in the two cases. Since my aim is to find a justificatory framework that helps
us understand how the underlying mental capacities of parrots with sophisticated
human-like behaviours function, we need to move to a higher level of abstraction and
take a more structural approach.
Section 3: The causal isomorphism approach
Likewise rejecting approaches like Sober’s, Sandra D. Mitchell offers a different
framework for justifying interspecific inferences, based on isomorphism in the causal

Jeanne M. Serb, “Toward Developing Models to Study the Disease, Ecology, and Evolution of
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structures underlying the similar behaviours. Mitchell’s approach usefully allows us to
consider inferences between species, regardless of their phylogenetic relatedness. I
argue, however, that the causal isomorphism approach is of limited use for the
inferences we’re interested in, due to being too closely tied to specific implementation.

3.1 Mitchell on traditional approaches to justification
According to Mitchell, specific claims of similarity must be assessed based on
evidence that there are causally isomorphic structures at work in the two sets of
observed behaviour. If there are similar causal mechanisms that generate the similarseeming behaviours, then the claim of similar mental capacities is supported.
Mitchell explicitly rejects what she calls the traditional approach to justifying these
inferences. On the traditional approach, a claim about the unobserved internal or mental
feature of the other individual is supported by relevant similarities between the two
individuals. The line of reasoning starts with the observation that one individual, the
model system, has certain features A, B, C. The other individual, the target of the
analogy, is also observed to have certain features A, B, C. On the basis that the model
system is also observed to have feature D, the target system is also inferred to have
unobserved feature D. Mitchell notes that on this approach, “The strength of the analogy
is sometimes rendered in terms of the number of similarities between the two
systems.”158 Mitchell objects to the traditional approach on the basis that the sheer
number of similarities doesn’t licence an assumption that those similarities are relevant
to the feature in question. If the similarities are not relevant – and we cannot assume
158

Mitchell, “Anthropomorphism,” 3.

112

that they are – then it doesn’t matter how many irrelevant similarities the model and
target systems share. No number of irrelevant similarities can inform us about whether
the noteworthy feature is present.
Mitchell analyzes the justification from phylogenetic proximity in terms of the
traditional approach. She explains, “Here the phylogenetic proximity is brought to bear to
say we have more similarities with chimps than other species since we are historically
closer to them. Divergence occurred more recently – than to other species and hence
we expect them to be more like us.”159 She denies that this traditional approach provides
anything more than weak justification for the analogy. While it would be reasonable to
expect that humans and chimpanzees have many common features, we should also
expect that there are many differences, given that they are two separate species.
Humans and chimpanzees are distinct species precisely because the two species
diverged from our last common ancestor millions of years ago. Since divergence is
assumed, there must be some dissimilarities between the species. The problem is that
the relevant features may be precisely those that “constituted the break in the
lineage.”160 No amount of other similar features we share can tell us whether the
noteworthy feature is also one that we share with chimpanzees. Therefore, phylogenetic
proximity on the traditional approach can only provide weak justification for analogical
inferences.
3.2 Justifying inferences based on causal isomorphism
Mitchell argues for a stronger analogical inference on the basis of causally
isomorphic structures. She writes, “A stronger analogical inference is supported when
159
160
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there is justification for isomorphism of causal structures in the two systems generating
the features we are interested in.”161 This idea needs to be unpacked. By “features”, I
take Mitchell to be referring primarily to the features observed to be shared, i.e., the
similar observed behaviours. It is not clear whether she also means the unobserved
features of interest that we are hypothesizing about, i.e., the internal mental processes
or capacities underlying the behaviour. The idea seems to be that we can justify a
similar-mental-capacity inference based on analogy, when we have reason to think that
the causes of the two sets of behaviours are structured in the same ways. On Mitchell’s
view, while the causes themselves do not need to be identical, they must be isomorphic,
which means there must be a one-to-one mapping of each causal component.
Since Mitchell’s framework attends to all the causal factors leading to the
behaviour, it takes into account the conditions under which the individuals learned the
behaviour. To illustrate how Mitchell’s approach might work, consider the causal factors
allowing human children to learn to communicate referentially. Humans can
communicate meaningfully because they’ve learned what words mean, often in an
environment with other language-users, and also because they have the cognitive
capacity for symbolic communication. Research suggests that a skeletal base of
language is part of the biology of children.162 To develop language skills with full
complexity, children generally need to be exposed to language speakers within the
critical developmental period for learning, which ends at around 6 years of age. Beyond
this critical period, there may be a marginal period during which children may be able to
learn some aspects of linguistic communication, but they are unlikely to attain full
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fluency. It seems that the farther outside this critical period that language exposure
occurs, the less that language skills will develop.
So, we might describe the causal structure leading to normal human
communication skills in terms of certain biological facts about language-processing
areas of the brain, normal cognitive development, and exposure to language use during
the critical period. We could also describe the cause of the behaviour in terms of factors
influencing the evolution of communicative ability in humans. Then, to determine
whether there is causal isomorphism with another individual communicating referentially,
we’d examine whether every biological fact with a given causal role for the first individual
(the model) has an analogous causal component in the other individual (the target), with
no additional components. If additional causal factors are required to explain the
behaviour for either individual, then there would be no isomorphism between the two.
Let us consider the case in which the target individual is a member of the same
species: another human. When trying to infer analogically about the mental mechanisms
of other humans, we have strong reason to think that the functional traits of conspecifics
derive from the same causal structures, which are therefore isomorphic. Mitchell
explicitly writes, “There are good grounds to assume that basic causal structures or
mechanisms are the same for different members of the same species of organism.”163
This reasoning is based on the idea that basic biological mechanisms connected to
survival and fitness are the ones that face the strongest selective pressures. Because
selection acts so strongly on these functional traits, we can expect that variants of these
traits with even slightly negative consequences will be extinguished from the population.
On the other hand, a mutation with a positive effect would be expected to proliferate and
163
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undergo fixation until there are no other variants left in the population. Thus, Mitchell
writes, “It nevertheless is a safe assumption that there will be little variation in the basic
functioning of organisms within a species.”164
For Mitchell, species membership is only one justification for thinking that two
systems are causally isomorphic. Mitchell also requires statistical and experimental
evidence to support claims that the mental causal systems are isomorphic.165 Thus,
whether the two sets of behaviours are caused by equivalent causal structures is a
question that requires empirical investigation. Experimental data needs to be collected to
determine the nature of the capacities at work. In the case of linguistic behaviour, for
example, to get evidence for causal isomorphism, we might observe the individuals’
other behaviours that might indicate normal (or abnormal) cognitive development,
compare their social and linguistic environments, record the developmental time period
at which certain language skills are acquired, and scan which parts of the individuals’
brains are active during linguistic behaviour. Given an adequate specification of the
causal structure allowing humans to communicate referentially, if we find a one-to-one
mapping of the causal components in the target individual, then we are warranted in
using causal isomorphism to justify an inference of similar cognitive capacities. In this
case, an appeal to equivalent causal factors justifies a claim that the mental capacities
underlying the similar behaviours are functionally equivalent.
The key question for determining justificatory basis for a similar-mental-capacity
claim is whether the causal structures that generate the similar-seeming behaviours in
the two individuals are isomorphic. According to Mitchell, what justifies some analogies
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but not others are “background assumptions about the nature of intra and inter species
similarity and behavioural experiments.”166 If we have good reason, including empirical
evidence, to think that the structures causing the behaviours are isomorphic with
analogous causal components, then we have good reason to think that similar mental
processes may be at work.
3.3 Applying the causal isomorphism approach to interspecific inferences about Alex
Now, let us apply the causal isomorphism approach to an interspecific inference,
e.g., from human to grey parrot. Mitchell’s approach has the advantage of allowing us to
compare the conditions under which humans and Alex learn referential communication.
This kind of comparison makes sense, for if Alex learns a skill in a way that’s similar to
how a human learns that skill, the similarity in how the two capacities are actualized may
be evidence that the capacities themselves are similar. This feature is especially
significant when dealing with complex behaviours, such as referential communication,
that are acquired by social learning.
In this case, we could analyze Alex’s referential communication into two separate
components: (1) the underlying cognitive ability to link symbols to concepts and use
them to refer; and (2) his acquisition of the particular symbols or words he uses. The
second component of Alex’s ability, i.e., understanding the referents of the particular
words that he knows, involves a set of environmental conditions and training. In Alex’s
case, he had the opportunity to observe English-speaking humans communicating and
interacting on a regular basis, not only during the Model/Rival training sessions but also
informally, outside of training.
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There are numerous similarities between how Alex the parrot learned to
communicate referentially and how humans do. Like most human children, Alex was
socialized in a linguistic environment where he was exposed to spoken English early in
life. Alex’s training began at about age 1. He learned within an interactive social context,
by hearing spoken English words, observing them being used by different people, and
being taught to vocalize and use the words himself. Mitchell’s approach can also take
into account various neurophysiological or physical similarities, e.g., the fact that both
humans and parrots have a concentration of brain function in the head.
However, that there are also differences in how Alex and typical human children
acquire speech. When exposed to a linguistic environment during the first few years of
life, children typically acquire full language ability. Although Alex was also exposed to a
linguistic environment during the first few years of his life, he never acquired full
language skills. While it is difficult to determine the extent to which these differences in
language acquisition should be attributed to cognitive or morphological capability, these
differences do exist.
Regarding the first component, it would be reasonable to assume that if an
individual grey parrot has the general cognitive capacity to acquire symbolic, referential
communication, then other members of the species would have the same capacity.
Accordingly, we can consider the causal system of this trait at the species level.
Although it’s been hypothesized that parrots and humans have analogous forebrain
pathways for vocal learning,167 we do not yet know if grey parrots have two brain areas
for speech production and comprehension that are analogous to Broca’s and Wernicke’s
Erich D. Jarvis, “Neural Systems for Vocal Learning in Birds and Humans: A Synopsis,”
Journal of Ornithology 148, no. 1 (December 1, 2007): 35–44, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10336007-0243-0.
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areas in human brains. If we cannot establish that there are one-to-one functional
analogues in the brains of humans and parrots, then we lack sufficient evidence for the
causal isomorphism needed to ground a similar-mental-capacity claim on Mitchell’s view.
Based on this analysis, we would not have sufficient evidence to claim isomorphic
causal structures. Therefore, on Mitchell’s approach, there would be no justification for
inferring that the mental capacities underlying Alex’s referential communication are
similar to those in humans.
3.4 Resources of the causal isomorphism approach
Mitchell’s justificatory framework thus offers several resources; it suggests
avenues for further research, accepts various kinds of evidence, and accounts for more
diverse causal factors than Sober’s does. Given a sufficiently fleshed-out understanding
of the causal structure in the model system (e.g., how humans acquire referential
communication), Mitchell’s approach provides useful guidance about the kinds of causal
factors that may be relevant and worthy of further scientific investigation. Mitchell’s
approach reveals what needs to be investigated to justify a claim about functionally
equivalent mental capacities. In this example, we would need to know whether parrot
brains have functional analogues to human brains for speech production and
comprehension.
Mitchell also accepts self-reports as indirect evidence, so these could be another
source of justification. Alex’s verbal communication skills open up an interesting
possibility for self-reports of his mental states. An interesting fact is that Alex has
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verbally reported his susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer optical illusion.168 Similar to many
humans, Alex experiences a line with arrows pointing outwards as being longer than a
line of equal length with arrows pointing inwards. If visual processing of this optical
illusion were related to verbal processing or symbolic communication, then these selfreports from Alex could provide some evidence about the causal mechanisms at work in
his communicative behaviour.169 (Note that susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion has
been found to vary across humans,170 so any support given by similar susceptibility to
the illusion might go toward specific individual-to-individual analogical inferences about
similar psychological processes, rather than species-to-species inferences.)
Importantly, Mitchell’s approach can account for the similar conditions by which
Alex learned to communicate referentially using English words. His training was similar
to how humans learn to communicate in that the learner observes other members of his
social group interacting and coordinating via communication. However, the formal
structure of the Model/Rival training method used with Alex represents a significant
difference from humans. Humans can typically acquire referential communication, at a
level comparable to Alex, without formal training.
3.5 Limitations of the causal isomorphism approach
Irene M. Pepperberg, Jennifer Vicinay, and Patrick Cavanagh, “Processing of the Müller-Lyer
Illusion by a Grey Parrot (Psittacus Erithacus),” Perception 37, no. 5 (2008): 765 – 781,
https://doi.org/10.1068/p5898.
169 Mitchell includes some caveats about self-reports. First, she emphasizes that we cannot
guarantee similar subjective experiences, given similar verbal reports between two humans. This
concern seems to arise only with respect to experiences that are qualitatively difficult to describe.
She uses the example of colour perception, pointing out that we cannot presume that Person A
who reports that she sees “red” is really experiencing the same red as Person B who also reports
seeing “red”. But, this problem seems to arise because the word “red” fails to represent a specific
colour experience; instead,“red” denotes a family of experiences that fall within the “red” range.
Secondly, she articulates the concern that self-reports may be unreliable.
170 John W. Berry, “Ecology, Perceptual Development and the Müller-Lyer Illusion,” British Journal
of Psychology 59, no. 3 (1968): 205–210; Marshall H. Segall, Donald T. Campbell, and Melville J.
Herskovits, “Cultural Differences in the Perception of Geometric Illusions,” Science 139, no. 3556
(February 22, 1963): 769–71, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.139.3556.769.
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As seen in the case of Alex, our ability to assess the similar-mental-capacity
inference based on Mitchell’s approach depends on having reliable and detailed
knowledge about the causal factors in each case, in addition to one-to-one
correspondence between the two causal systems. If we could establish that each causal
factor in the model system had its equivalent in the causal structure in the target system
and vice versa, then we’d have good justification for the inference. Unfortunately, in
practice, it would be difficult to make a strong case for robust analogy on this approach.
To justify a claim of causal isomorphism would require much evidence not only about the
causal factors for the model behaviour, but also the causal factors for the target
behaviour. It may not always be feasible or worthwhile to investigate the causal factors
so thoroughly for the purposes of making a similarity-based conjecture. The concern is
especially pertinent given that how robustly the claim can be made depends on the
robustness of our understanding of the causal structures of both systems. In most cases,
it might seem inefficient to expend resources to gather sufficient evidence about the
likely factors causing the target behaviour in order to make a similarity inference about
its underlying mechanism rather than to study the nature of the underlying mechanism
directly. If we rely on indirect evidence, the analogical claim becomes weaker. Given the
cost of amassing the required evidence about each causal factor, Mitchell’s approach
seems difficult to put to full use.
Another concern is that Mitchell’s isomorphism condition may seem arbitrary and
unnecessary. Mitchell’s approach requires that the components of each causal structure
correspond to each other in a one-to-one relation between the model and the target.
However, it’s not clear why a component in one causal structure couldn’t map onto two
or more components serving the same role in the other causal structure and provide the
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same justificatory basis for a similar-mental-capacity inference. The demand for
isomorphism also presents problems in deciding how to differentiate individual
components. A complex causal factor could count as a single component or multiple
components, depending on the level of abstraction. Thus, Mitchell’s approach seems
limited in application, for it overemphasizes the importance of having the same number
of components in each causal system underlying the similar behavioural trait.
Consider, for example, the number of sexes involved in sexual reproduction.
Most cases of sexual reproduction involve two sexes (e.g., male and female). However,
scientific research has discovered some populations of ants in the Pogonomyrmex
genus in which more than two sexes are required to sustain the population.171 In these
perpetually hybridizing populations, the queen must mate with two types of males: males
from the same gene pool as well as males from the opposite gene pool. If the queen
mates only with males from the same gene pool as she is from, they will produce
queens, but they will produce no workers. With no workers, it would be impossible to
found a colony. If the queen mates only with males from the opposite gene pool, then
they produce workers but they will not produce queens. Colony founding could occur,
but since the colony would only produce males (from unfertilized eggs) and sterile
workers, there would be no future queens. Thus, the queen needs to mate with both
types of males to produce workers, reproductive males and reproductive females
(queens), who are all required to sustain a population through generations. Sexual
reproduction functions to produce offspring who are genetically similar to their parents. If
sexual reproduction were defined in causally isomorphic terms, we would presuppose a
certain number of sexes (e.g., typically two), which would exclude certain sexually
Joel D. Parker, “A Major Evolutionary Transition to More than Two Sexes?,” Trends in Ecology
& Evolution 19, no. 2 (2004): 83–86.
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reproductive organisms (e.g., the ants discussed here). Such exclusion would
unproductively obscure the functional similarities between different cases of sexual
reproduction. To understand the different ways in which sexual reproduction functions in
populations, we should include such populations, regardless of the number of sexes they
have. Thus, a causal isomorphism approach is inappropriate if we are looking to
understand how systems function.
For the project of understanding how Alex’s capacity for referential
communication functions, it does not seem critical to know whether he has exactly the
same number of causal components for communication as in humans (e.g., exactly two
brain areas for speech production and comprehension). Indeed, in discourse about the
cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, the focus is often not on whether we can
make causal isomorphism claims, but rather on whether the capacity underlying the
behaviour passes the threshold for genuine cognition. Skeptics often respond that the
behaviour can be alternatively explained by simpler mental processes. For example,
Herbert Terrace suggested that Alex’s behaviour was “a rote response,” in which Alex
was only “minimally” thinking.172 Is Alex’s behaviour a reflection of rote learning of
stimulus-word associations, or does he genuinely understand and mentally represent
what words mean (like humans)? Establishing the same number of causal components
to Alex’s behaviour does not help settle these questions. Thus, we need to move on
from the causal isomorphism approach.
Thus far, I have argued that both Sober’s and Mitchell’s approaches fail to give
an appropriate justificatory framework to assess the kind of similarity-based inference I
am interested in. Both Sober’s and Mitchell’s approaches focus on causal factors, either
172
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in a common cause or in an isomorphic causal structure. However, the key questions
about Alex’s communicative behaviour have to do with the nature of the behaviour and
its underlying capacity, not its causal history. In relation to these purposes, both of their
approaches place undue emphasis on causal factors. We need a framework that will
provide a principled basis for understanding similarities in the cognitive capacities of
animals with complex behaviours, e.g., a parrot that communicates referentially like a
human child does. Given that I’m looking to understand how these underlying cognitive
capacities function, I suggest that we shift to an even higher level of abstraction that
focuses more on functional relations than on causal components.
Section 4: The relational structure approach
For a more functional analysis, I look to cognitive scientist Dedre Gentner’s
structure-mapping theory of analogical reasoning, by which we can map knowledge from
one domain to another based on similar systems of relations within each of the two
domains. In this section, I begin by describing Gentner’s theory of analogical reasoning.
Then, I will apply it to the case of Alex the parrot, thus showing how a Gentner-inspired
analysis can helpfully illuminate relevant similarities in the communicative behaviours of
Alex and humans.
4.1 Justifying inferences based on structural relations
Gentner and Jeziorski analyze modern scientific analogical reasoning as a way
to map knowledge between domains based on similar systems of relations within each
of the two domains. According to them, “An analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one
domain (the base) into another (the target) such that a system of relations that holds
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among the base objects also holds among the target objects.”173 Reasoning by analogy
happens in several steps in a structure-mapping process. First, the thinker finds a
common relational system between two situations. Second, the thinker infers from one
situation to the other, based on these commonalities. Thus, the structure-mapping
process brings inferences from the model domain to the target domain, based on
relevant similarities between them. What’s needed to ground the analogy is a common
relational structure in the two situations, not merely properties they have in common.
Thus, analogical inference can be justified by certain similarities in the structural features
of two systems.
Consider the example given by Gentner and Jeziorski, “A cell is like a factory.”
Through analogical reasoning, one could infer that a “cell takes in resources to keep
itself operating and to generate products.”174 The relevant features of the analogy
include its constitutive features and processes such as inputs, outputs, and
consequences. Its concrete, material and contingent features should be ignored. In this
example, one should not infer that a cell is made of bricks due to the fact that a factory is
made of bricks, since a factory could be made of entirely different materials in theory. On
the other hand, it is constitutive of a factory that it produces something useful and
valuable from its inputs. If it produced nothing, it would not be a functioning factory. So,
the relevant feature in the analogy is that a factory takes in resources as inputs, then
produces valuable outputs from those resources. In this way, analogical reasoning is
based on similarities in relevant functional relations between the model and target
systems.

Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski, “The Shift from Metaphor to Analogy in Western
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174 Gentner and Jeziorski.
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Gentner theorizes that analogical reasoning requires aligning two situations
based on these commonalities and projecting inferences from model to target according
to such alignment. For a maximal structural match between model and target, there are
two desiderata. First, the model and target are structurally consistent such that each
element in the model representation corresponds to exactly one element in the target
representation. Second, the analogy should be systematic in that the common structure
of the model and target is large with deeply connected relations; such analogies are
more informative and have more inferential power than those that are simpler and lessconnected.175 The systematicity condition emphasizes deeply structured higher-order
structural analogies.
4.2 Comparing the causal isomorphism and relational structure approaches
Let us compare the resources available in a Gentner-inspired relational structure
approach with those in the causal isomorphism approach. Similar to the causal
isomorphism approach, the relational structure approach also allows us to consider
diverse causal factors in the behaviour, including the conditions under which Alex
acquired referential communication. Both approaches can accept diverse kinds of
evidence to support the inference. Likewise, if we are trying to construct an analogy
between model and target, but there is something we don’t know about the structure of
the system, the relational structure approach to analogy can highlight avenues for further
research. Thus, the relational structure approach makes available all the resources from
Mitchell’s approach that were helpful.
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In addition, the relational structure offers further resources not available in
Mitchell’s causal isomorphism approach. First, the relational structure approach allows
consideration of not only causal factors, but also functional and other relevant relations.
Thus, we can consider relevant factors in the system without establishing their causal
role. The relational structure approach can allow us to include hypotheses about the
kinds of factors that may have played a role in the evolution of the capacity. For
example, we might reason that a certain kind of sociality supports the development of
the capacity for referential communication in certain species. Interestingly, grey parrots
have a social structure that is analogous to human society. Grey parrots have a complex
fission-fusion social structure, in which smaller subgroups of individuals merge into
larger flocks of hundreds of parrots at some times, then split back into small groups at
other times.176 Humans also have close associates (e.g., close friends, family) with
whom they spend much of their time, while also coming together in larger groups (e.g.,
for work, education, celebrations, protests). Thus, ecological facts about the species,
that are plausibly hypothesized but not known to have played a functional role, can be
considered.
Second, in a Gentner-inspired relational structure approach, isomorphism is
optimal for a maximal structural match that gives maximally strong justification, but
isomorphism is not required for justifying an analogical inference less strongly. Thus, the
relational structure approach provides a way to include non-isomorphic functional
equivalence as justificatory (where each functional role in the model is filled by a set of
components in the target, though not necessarily the same number of components).
Non-isomorphic justification of analogical inference is possible on this view. For
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example, humans have two brain areas for speech production and comprehension,
called Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas. On the relational structure approach, it is no longer
critical that grey parrots have two brain areas for such functions to obtain a one-to-one
correspondence with humans’ two brain areas. We could justify an analogical inference
regardless of the number of areas in grey parrots’ brains that deal with such processes.
Thus, the relational structure approach avoids the problem of arbitrariness that faces
Mitchell’s isomorphism condition.
Moreover, on the relational structure approach, more emphasis is placed on
similarities in higher-order structural relations. Thus, lower-order discrepancies between
the model and target may not rule out our ability to justify an inference, if other relevant
similarities hold, especially those that are closely connected to candidate inferences.
4.3 Applying the relational structure approach to interspecific inferences about Alex
Let us consider how a Gentner-inspired approach might provide justification for
candidate inferences about Alex. We can analyze referentially communicative behaviour
into two components involving (1) the underlying cognitive ability for referential
communication; and (2) the individual’s acquisition of particular symbols used in
communication, which depends on training and environment. The candidate inference
I’m considering is a claim about (1), namely that grey parrots have the cognitive capacity
for genuinely referential communication, similar to humans’ cognitive capacity for the
same.
Regarding the learning component, Alex acquired referential communication
under MUSE conditions, similar to how humans acquire language (see Chapter 2). Alex
was highly motivated to learn to communicate referentially with humans; he was likely
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motivated to integrate with humans in the lab, who were the only social group available
to him. Alex learned to communicate referentially under conditions that explicitly
demonstrated the usefulness of speech’s referentiality, within an interactive social
context with two humans who spoke with each other as well as him, and he was
regularly exposed to these communicative contexts after he was acquired by
Pepperberg’s lab at the age of one. With training under the MUSE conditions, Alex
demonstrated referentially communicative behaviour, both in producing appropriate
speech, as well as in perceiving and comprehending spoken words. Consequently, we
have a robust analogy between the conditions under which humans and Alex learned to
communicate.
Moreover, we can further flesh out the structural relations that support the
candidate inference by theorizing about factors in the evolution of the capacity for
referential communication. Conditions that might be expected in the development of
such capacity include certain ecological factors, such that communication aids in
survival. The social life of the species would be structured to support cooperation, so
that communication helps individuals coordinate with each other, and such coordination
benefits them. Michael Tomasello argues that human communication arises from
humans’ capacity for shared intentionality and pro-social motivations to help and share
with others.177 According to Tomasello, humans were able to invent language and math
because humans engaged in a powerful form of social learning, in which individuals
collaborate with each simultaneously and also across historical time, as successive
generations learned from their predecessors and improved on their innovations.178 Parts
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of this story about human evolution corresponds with what we know about grey parrots,
especially with respect to group coordination and cooperation. Grey parrots also have a
fission-fusion social structure and have been observed congregating in huge flocks for
feeding, taking turns such that some parrots remain in trees, calling, while others feed on
the ground. This behaviour has been interpreted as a group vigilance method for
avoiding predators.179 If so, then grey parrots improve their chances for survival by
coordinating with one another via vocal communication. Thus, we could get additional
justification for the candidate analogical inference when we consider the ecology and
behaviour of grey parrots in relation to hypotheses about the evolution of human
language capacity.
4.4 Concluding remarks
Thus, I have shown how a relational structure approach inspired by Gentner’s
structure-mapping theory of analogical reasoning provides a justificatory framework for
the candidate inference about Alex. By comparing the relational structures of the two
domains, we can draw analogical inferences about the cognitive capacities underlying
Alex’s referential communication, which is similar to the communicative behaviour of
humans. The relational structure approach allows us to account for the relevant factors
and characteristics, and how they relate to each other, at the appropriate level of
abstraction to understand what Alex is doing. Thus, the relational structure framework
can help us focus on relevant similarities between human and nonhuman behaviour. By
using this framework, we can analyze nonhuman animal behaviours that are similar to
complex human behaviours and draw productive comparisons between them on a
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principled basis; we can better understand the cognitive processes underlying complex
nonhuman animal behaviour.
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